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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: IN-NETWORK FILTERING OF DISTRIBUTED
DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACK TRAFFIC
1.1 DDoS Attacks and Mitigation
1.1.1 Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks. Distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attacks continue to threaten the availability and integrity of
critical Internet infrastructure upon which the society relies more heavily than ever
before. The ever-growing connectivity and bandwidth of end-hosts on the Internet,
coupled with the skyrocketing number of Internet-connected devices, with a vast
number of these hosts and devices compromisable to launch distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks, has made the DDoS attacks easier to launch but harder
to defend. Despite years of research and industry efforts that have led to a myriad
of defense approaches, the Internet has recently witnessed a sharp increase in the
number and scale of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Among the most
common DDoS attacks are high-volume DDoS attacks that overwhelm a victim’s
bandwidth, in which such attacks can reach as high as 1.2 Tbps (Dyn Research
(2016)), 1.35 Tbps (Kottler (2018)) or even 1.7 Tbps (Morales (2018)). Figure 1
shows an example of a simple DDoS attack. Attacker invoke compromised machines
from multiple autonomous systems (ASes), i.e. AS4, AS5, AS6, to send unwanted
traffic to the victim at AS1. The DDoS attack travels through AS2 and AS3 to
reach the destination.
1.1.2 DDoS Mitigation by Filtering Traffic. This threat continues
to grow, despite years of research and industry efforts which have resulted in a
myriad of unique DDoS traffic filtering strategies, ranging from source-end filtering








Figure 1. Example of an DDoS attack.
traffic filtering strategies conduct traffic filtering at the edge of the Internet (“edge-
defense”), i.e. locations topologically close to or at the attack victims. Such defense
does not stop the attack traffic from aggregating to a significant volume causing
link congestion before the traffic even reaching the victim.
On the other hand, the Internet has seen a growing proliferation of filtering
capabilities throughout. With Access Control Lists (ACLs) built into routers by
vendors from day one, broader usage of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) flow
specification, the advent of software-defined networking (SDN), and so on, Internet
service providers (ISPs) at the core of the Internet or proxies and firewalls at the
edge are equipped and ready to filter traffic, including DDoS traffic. Unfortunately,
their filtering of DDoS traffic has mostly been preliminary, such as simply blocking
all traffic to a victim, including the legitimate packets. Thus, the Internet today is








Victim Attacker DDoS Attack Router
Traffic Filters Defending AS
Figure 2. Example of an edge DDoS traffic filtering.
1.1.3 Edge Traffic Filtering. Traditionally, the DDoS defense is
considered edge defense, in which either the DDoS victim, or a third-party entity
is entrusted to conducts the defense, and the defense happens at the edge of the
Internet. There are two problems that makes edge defense less effective against
current and future DDoS attacks. First, the cost is usually very high for any one
single entity to handle Terabit-per-second-level DDoS attack traffic. Making things
worse, the attackers can now more easily tap to increasingly popular yet less secure
Internet-of-Things devices to launch attacks with record-high volume (Lumbis,
Ramdoss, and Miller (2014); Pagiamtzis and Sheikholeslami (2006)). Secondly,
even with sufficient investment on handling incoming DDoS traffic at the edge, the
3
defense, in many cases, can already be late due to traffic congestion that happens
before reaching the edge. It is not uncommon to see traffic congestion happen
before reaching the victim, and work in Kang, Lee, and Gligor (2013) revealed
attacks that triggers congestion around the victim without directly launch attacks
at the victim. Edge defense cannot sufficiently handle such cases, and people turn
to in-network defense solutions.
Figure 2 shows and example of DDoS traffic filtering happens at the edge
of the Internet, specifically at the victim of the attack. The victim in this attack
(AS1) places traffic filters at its networks’ ingress points to stop the unwanted
DDoS traffic from reaching the victim. However, in the scenario when the traffic
gets congested before reaching the victim, the victim-side traffic filtering cannot
stop the packet loss caused by congestion upstream.
1.1.4 In-network Traffic Filtering. In-network DDoS defense,
suggested by the name, places the defense efforts inside the Internet, along the
paths of the DDoS attack traffic. Instead of defending at the edge, they defend
against DDoS attacks before the traffic reaches the victim, often when the DDoS
traffic is even further away from the victim’s network. These solutions often also
distribute the defending workload among a set of defensive collaborators, each
in charge of a portion of the traffic. Collectively, the set of collaborators are able
to handle a larger volume of DDoS traffic than any individual collaborator. It
has the following advantages over edge defense. First, in-network defense allows
sharing of the defense load, reducing the defense efforts required at each defending
entity. Defenders carry less burden, and can achieve higher overall defense capacity
Second, the filtering of DDoS traffic can happen earlier, reducing the traffic load
along way to the victim, thus mitigating the traffic congestion on the links before
4
reaching the victim. Overall, in-network DDoS defense becomes more suitable and







Victim Attacker DDoS Attack Router
Traffic Filters Defending AS
Figure 3. Example of an in-network DDoS traffic filtering
Figure 3 shows and example of in-network DDoS traffic filtering. The
victim in this attack requests filters to be placed at its upstream providers, i.e.
AS2 and AS3, and the providers place traffic filters at their network to stop the
corresponding traffic. In-network traffic filtering stops the traffic early and reduce
the traffic stress at the links downstream.
1.2 What’s Missing
Although many works have studied topics related to efficient filtering
of DDoS traffic, there are still important and yet unresolved issues that makes
5
effective in-network traffic filtering difficult to achieve. In this section, we will
summarize the important related work and describes the missing points. Chapter II
describes the related-work in more details.
First, there is a lack of studies that investigate incentives of in-network (or
collaborative) DDoS filtering. Although many works have studied incentives for
potential defenders to participate defense in different fields of cyber security, such
as presented in Bedi, Roy, and Shiva (2011); Bohawek, Hespanha, Lee, Lim, and
Obraczka (2007), majority of such studies focus on the interactions between the
defenders and the attackers, and leaving the influences of among the defenders
unexplored. In the context of in-network traffic filtering, the inter-dependent
relationships among defenders is an key factor that affects the incentives, especially
when defenders are competitors themselves.
Second, there is a lack of comprehensive surveys and modeling of the filter-
placing strategies that in-network traffic filtering solutions can apply. Although
many in-network DDoS defense solutions have been proposed, it still remains
difficult for a victim to select suitable defense solutions against specific DDoS
attacks. The in-network defense solutions (such as DefCOM, PushBack, and
MiddlePolice) vary greatly in resource requirements, training data needed, and
expected efficiency. Selecting a sub-optimal defense solution could introduce
substantial cost and even result in unsuccessful defense. However, there is no
quantitative study on how the solutions compare to each other, nor a general
model that describes these solutions in a common language. Further, it is also
unknown how these solutions perform under insufficient knowledge of the attacks or
against intelligent adversaries who can dynamically revise their attack strategies to
escape defense. Without a quantitative comparison, it is hard for a DDoS victim to
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select the most suitable solution to achieve its defense goal and meet the resource
requirements.
Third, there is a lack of design and evaluation of an in-network, DDoS-
filtering rule placement algorithm that can effectively deploy traffic filters at optimal
locations. Many existing solutions for in-network traffic filtering only focusing
on providing communication channels to enable collaboration, but leaving the
filter placement strategies unexplored. With placement strategy selected, much
work still needs to be done to properly design specific algorithm that implement
the selected placement strategy and adjust to inputs from the system in order to
achieve maximum performance. Deploying of the filters at the appropriate locations
also requires the system to be designed and implemented to work with current
deployable technology.
1.3 Dissertation Statement
This dissertation addresses the missing gaps described in Section 1.2. The
dissertation statement is as follows:
In-network filtering of the distributed denial-of-service attack
traffic is more advantageous than filtering at the edge, can incentivize
Internet service providers to adopt, and can be implemented via an
effective rule placement algorithm.
1.4 Research Contributions
This research aims to bridge the gaps, and better understand the approaches
toward building an effective DDoS traffic filtering systems against DDoS attacks.
Overall, this dissertation makes contributions in the following three dimensions: the
incentives of networks participating in in-network traffic filtering; the modeling and
improvement of the strategies that can be applied to conducting the filtering; and
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lastly the design, and evaluation of an effective filtering rule placement algorithm.
Detailed contributions are as follows.
Incentives to participate in in-network traffic filtering:
First, we study the underlying incentives for networks on the Internet to
defend against DDoS attacks. We propose a game-theoretical model that abstracts
the interactions between customer and provider networks via probabilistic provider
selection, examines the incentives of ASes to invest in efforts on DDoS defense.
Based on the model, we built a large-scale simulation system and examine 1)
whether networks on the Internet can be incentivized to participate in in-network
traffic filtering, and 2) the affects of a network’s topological location, level of
competition, and the amount of DDoS traffic it carries for its customer affects its
decision on DDoS filtering efforts.
We observe the following patterns from the simulation results. The majority
of the provider ASes on the Internet can benefit from providing DDoS defense
services to their customers if they can compensate the defense cost by charging
for filtering DDoS traffic. The severity of DDoS attacks affects the charge rate
a provider can place on its potential customers; if a provider sees higher volume
of DDoS traffic going through its potential customers, it would charge higher to
achieve its peak profit. The level of competition also drives the charge rate: a
provider with low-level competition can charge a high rate while still profitable;
a provider that faces strong competitions need to charge less to attract customers
for profit.
These observations provide confidence that if in-network collaborative
defense mechanisms mature enough provider ASes on the Internet would have
incentive to participate in DDoS defense. We believe that such observations can
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further help researchers to develop better strategies to devise and deploy DDoS
defense solutions.
Strategies to apply for in-network traffic filtering:
Second, with proper understanding of the incentives of networks on DDoS
defense, we then study the theoretical strategies on in-network traffic filtering.
We introduce a modeling and simulation framework to systematically evaluate
in-network DDoS defense algorithms. The framework contains a general model
that can describe the attack and defense for various defense algorithms. Using
this model, we summarize the existing in-network DDoS defense algorithms into
two basic types: PushBack and SourceEnd. A PushBack algorithm employs
propagation-based mechanisms to locate suitable defense locations that are close
to the victim. A SourceEnd algorithm tries to locate sources of attacks and deploy
filtering rules as close to the sources as possible. These two types of algorithms
cover most in-network DDoS defense solutions. We then introduce a new type of
in-network algorithms that utilizes the topology of the attack sources and ASes
en route and locates suitable defending ASes in network at critical locations. We
call this type of algorithms StrategicPoints. We study both the existing PushBack
and SourceEnd algorithms and our proposed StrategicPoints algorithms in depth
on their defense performance, resource cost, and resiliency against intelligent
adversaries. We compare the results using two metrics: DDoS traffic leakage to the
victim and DDoS traffic pollution on the Internet. The simulation results provide
useful insights into the selection of defense algorithms in response to different
attack scenarios. StrategicPoints strikes a balance between DDoS traffic coverage
and pollution reduction, and is more effective in cases when resources are not
extremely restrictive.
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Filtering rule placement algorithm for optimal filtering
performance:
Lastly, we design, implement, and evaluate an in-network DDoS traffic
filtering rule placement algorithm that is effective against large-scale DDoS attacks
and able to locate optimal placement locations for traffic filtering rules. The
study is focused on both systematic and algorithmic design of the rule placement
algorithm. Specifically, we design an efficient rule placement algorithm that can
find optimal placements for a give set of rules. To achieve optimal results, we
design a tree-like data structure called H-tree to model the placements of the rules
on the DDoS traffic topology toward the victim. As a result, our algorithm can
find placement locations that maximize the coverage of the DDoS traffic, minimize
the rule space needed for deployment, and maximize the distance away from the
victim’s network.
1.5 Chapter Relationships
Although we studied in-network DDoS traffic filtering from three different
dimensions (i.e. incentives, strategies, and system designs) in separated chapters,
the efforts are inherently connected and the results benefits each other in return.
In particular, the relationships between the chapters is described as follows
(also shown in Figure 4). The study of the incentives for networks to conduct in-
network traffic filtering improves the understanding of the likelihood in-network
filter being deployed on the Internet. With confidence of the deployment incentives,
we can assume larger number of networks on the Internet can be utilized for in-
network filtering purpose. We then conduct study on the survey, modeling, and
improving of filter placement strategies which allow the potential DDoS attack
victims to better understand the efficacy and drawbacks of different filter placing
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mechanisms. Knowing the appropriate strategy for in-network filtering, the
algorithm design chapter introduces an effective algorithm that implements the
strategy and achieves the filtering of DDoS traffic in in-network style. The existence
of well-performing traffic filtering algorithm will further boost the incentives for





Figure 4. Relationship between chapters
1.6 Scope of this Dissertation
In this dissertation, we focus our efforts on the discovering of the incentives
for conducting in-network DDoS traffic filtering, the survey and improvement of
strategies for placing traffic filtering rules, and the design and evaluation of an in-
network traffic-filtering rule placement algorithm. There are also several related
research issues tightly intertwined with DDoS traffic filtering, each with their own
significance. We consider these topic orthogonal to our efforts and describe them in
the rest of this section.
One topic is the detection of DDoS attacks and the classification of the
DDoS attack traffic. Researchers have studied DDoS detection and classification
extensively. We believe a victim should also play an active role in detecting and
11
classifying DDoS traffic, given that it knows better what legitimate traffic it expects
than filtering nodes inside the network. Nonetheless, in this dissertation we do
not focus on DDoS detection and classification, but refer readers to existing rich
literature on this topic. The design of our in-network DDoS traffic filtering system
allows users to plugin existing traffic detection and classification system. Albeit
the correctness of detection and classification of DDoS traffic affects the mitigation
results, we consider these process orthogonal to our filtering system, where we focus
on where and how to most effectively deploy filters as filters coming in as input
from other components.
Another topic of its own significance is IP spoofing, as DDoS bots can
spoof their source IP address during a DDoS attack. Fortunately, not only has IP
spoofing been studied as a separate topic extensively, it has also been addressed
fairly successfully in the real world. In particular, with ever-growing deployment of
ingress filtering (Baker and Savola (2004)), nowadays, the number of IP addresses
that are still spoofable has reduced to 16.5% (Beverly and Bauer (2005); Matthew
Luckie, Ken Keys, Ryan Koga, Rob Beverly, kc claffy (2016)). Also note that many
DDoS attacks actually do not employ IP spoofing, either because it is hard to do
(e.g. IP address of reflectors in reflector attacks; IP address of bots in TCP-based
DDoS such as HTTP floods), can incur extra overhead of the attacker (e.g. to hide
a bot from the spoofing detection at their local network), or the attackers simply
do not care due to the abundance of DDoS bots. Rather than embedding anti-
spoofing mechanisms in the design of our filtering system, we assume IP spoofing to
be addressed separately by independent anti-spoofing efforts.
Lastly, although we use volumetric DDoS attacks (i.e. the attacks that
uses high volume of junk traffic to overwhelm victim’s networking resources) as
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an example target for defense, our design of the filtering system is not limited to
only this type of attacks. Provided appropriate traffic filters as input, our system is
able to locate appropriate locations for placing and applying the filters.
1.7 Road Map
The dissertation is organized to have each chapter address one of the
research goals above.
In Chapter II, we survey the work related to DDoS traffic filtering.
Section 2.1 overviews the existing traffic filtering solutions for DDoS mitigation.
Section 2.2 reviews work related to discovering incentives of deployment for various
cyber-security solution. Section 2.3 reviews current literate on strategies of placing
traffic filtering rules for DDoS defense. Section 2.4 discusses the existing solutions
for conducting in-network traffic filtering.
In Chapter III, we investigate the incentives for networks on the Internet to
participate in in-network DDoS defense efforts. Specifically, section 3.2 overviews
the problem of discovering incentives for in-network filtering; section 3.3 introduces
a game theoretical model of competition among ISPs for customers; section 3.4
describes the simulation setup and algorithms for this study; section 3.5 discusses
the simulation results; and section 3.6 summarizes the main conclusions the work.
In Chapter IV, we survey, model, and improve the strategies for the
networks to distributes DDoS defense efforts to achieve effective in-network traffic
filtering. Specifically, section 4.2 reviews the state-of-the-art related work on in-
network DDoS defense algorithms; section 4.3 formally defines our models that
describe the Internet, DDoS attacks, and DDoS defenses; section 4.4 introduces
a classification of in-network DDoS filtering strategies; section 4.6 examines the
simulation results and compares the three defense algorithms against different
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metrics; section 4.7 discusses limitations and open issues of this work; and finally
section 4.8 summarizes the conclusion and takeaways of this work.
In Chapter V, we introduce the mechanism design, algorithm, and
evaluation of a rule placement algorithm that can effectively locate filter
deployment locations and filter DDoS traffic. section 5.2 describes our design of
the filtering rule placement mechanism; section 5.3 introduces the detailed design of
our rule placement algorithm; section 5.4 reviews the evaluation of rule placement
algorithm, both using simulation and testbed emulation; section 5.5 summarizes the
conclusion and takeaways of this work.
Finally, Chapter VI concludes this dissertation and discusses the future
research directions.
1.8 Co-authored Materials and Acknowledgment
1.8.1 Co-authored Materials. Much of the work in this dissertation
is from previous collaborative publications. Below is a listing connecting the
chapters with the material and authors that contributed. A more detailed
elaboration on the division of labor is also provided at the beginning of each
chapter.
– Chapter III is mainly based on the work in Zhang, Wu, Li, and Reiher (2019),
which is a collaboration between Jiabin Wu, Jun Li, Peter Reiher and myself.
– Chapter IV is mainly based on the work in Zhang, Shi, Sisodia, Li, and
Reiher (2019), which is a collaboration between Lumin Shi, Devkishen
Sisodia, Jun Li, Peter Reiher and myself.
– Chapter V is mainly based on the work in Li et al. (2019), especially its
text on DDoS-filtering rule placement design and evaluation, which is
14
a collaboration between Jun Li, Lumin Shi, Devkishen Sisodia, Samuel
Mergendahl, Yebo Feng, Peter Reiher and myself.
In addition, Chapter II is mainly based on related work sections in (Li et al.
(2019); Zhang, Shi, et al. (2019); Zhang, Wu, et al. (2019)).
1.8.2 Acknowledgment. This project is in part the result of
funding provided by the Science and Technology Directorate of the United States
Department of Homeland Security under contract number D15PC00204. The
views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should
not be interpreted necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements,






At a very high level, the existing DDoS defense can be categorized into
two styles Zargar, Joshi, and Tipper (2013): edge traffic filtering, or in-network
traffic filtering. Edge filtering mechanisms defend against DDoS attacks within
one AS, and usually at the receiving end of the DDoS attack traffic. Single-AS
defense solutions, such as work from Sahay, Blanc, Zhang, and Debar (2015) (which
redirects attack traffic to middle-boxes close to the victim), RADAR (Zheng et
al. (2018)) (which detects and throttles attack traffic at the victim network),
SPIFFY (Kang, Gligor, and Sekar (2016)) (which temporarily increases the
effective bandwidth of a congested core link and observes the response to detect
and mitigate an attack), and Bohatei (Fayaz, Tobioka, Sekar, and Bailey (2015))
(which presents a flexible and elastic DDoS defense system geared towards a single
ISP providing customers with DDoS-defense-as-a-service), are easier to deploy
and more flexible to implement when compared to in-network defense solutions,
especially when network management complexity is reduced by leveraging software-
defined networking (SDN). Other industrial systems such as FastNetMon (Odintsov
(2019)) and Arbor APS (NETSCOUT (2019)) can detect and filter DDoS traffic.
The network operator can also manually connect (e.g. via ssh) to local routers to
install Access Control Lists (ACLs) to filter the DDoS traffic. However, many edge
defense solutions can incur a very high defense cost due to resource requirement
in the term of network connection and network devices (Lumbis et al. (2014);
Pagiamtzis and Sheikholeslami (2006)), and often fail to mitigate attacks when
victims’ inbound connections are inundated with DDoS traffic.
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The obvious drawbacks with solutions at the edge led to various in-network
DDoS defense solutions. The in-network DDoS defense solution, can reduce the
amount of resources needed at each collaborating AS and relieve ASes from
the heavy burden of network and equipment costs. Methods such as PushBack
(Mahajan et al. (2002a)), TVA (Yang, Wetherall, and Anderson (2008)), RAD
(Kline, Beaumont-Gay, Mirkovic, and Reiher (2009)), AITF (Argyraki and
Cheriton (2005)), DefCOM (Oikonomou, Mirkovic, Reiher, and Robinson (2006)),
and StopIt (X. Liu, Yang, and Lu (2008)) have proposed approaches to filtering
DDoS traffic in-network, at multiple relevant remote ISPs.
In the rest of this section, we will examine the work related to in-network
DDoS traffic filtering from three different angles:
1. section 2.2: the incentives for ASes on the Internet to participate in in-
network DDoS traffic filtering,
2. section 2.3: different strategies for placing filters for in-network defense,
3. section 2.4: designs and evaluations of different systems that conduct in-
network traffic filtering.
This chapter is derived from related work sections in (Li et al. (2019);
Zhang, Shi, et al. (2019); Zhang, Wu, et al. (2019)) that are resulted from
collaboration with other co-authors listed in them.
2.2 Discovering Deployment Incentives
There are abundant work studying address cyber-security problems from
both incentive and game-theoretical perspectives (Laszka, Felegyhazi, and Buttyan
(2014); Manshaei, Zhu, Alpcan, Bacşar, and Hubaux (2013); Papadimitriou
(2001); Roy et al. (2010)). Some studies from the angle of interactions between
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the attackers and defenders, while some other work explores inter-dependencies and
collaborations among defenders. We will survey closely related work in this section.
Numerous research projects have explored using game-theory to study
interactions between attackers and defenders in cyber security context. Bedi et al.
proposed a model to study optimal firewall settings for DDoS defense against
attackers (Bedi et al. (2011)). Bohawek et al. introduced game-theoretic stochastic
routing (GTSR) to minimize impact of link and router failures against intelligent
attackers (Bohawek et al. (2007)). In Shiva, Roy, and Dasgupta (2010), the authors
proposed an holistic architecture that incorporates behaviors of the attackers and
decide actions for the defenders, but the work lacks concrete evaluation. Wu et al.
(Wu, Shiva, Roy, Ellis, and Datla (2010)) developed a game-theoretical model
to study the most effective firewall settings to block DoS/DDoS traffic. All the
work above try to model and develop systems to mitigate attacks (which can be
intelligent and dynamic) from a single central-controlled entity. However, current
cyber attacks on the Internet, especially DDoS attacks, can no-longer be easily
mitigated by single AS.
There are studies that investigate the potential collaboration among
defenders against cyber-attacks. In Grossklags, Christin, and Chuang (2008b), the
authors analyzed how influences among heterogeneous entities could reach different
security end-results under five different economic environment. They later studied
how the inter-dependent defenders may shift between public good (protection)
and private good (insurance) given the choices (Grossklags, Christin, and Chuang
(2008a)). Similarly, in Miura-Ko, Yolken, Mitchell, and Bambos (2008), the authors
model the impacts of security investment among interdependent organizations using
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influence network. However, the lack of quantitative evaluation and conclusion
making it less applicable on real-world problems.
Some work study cyber security with a focus on defense incentives. Early
work by Huang et al. (Huang, Geng, and Whinston (2007)) analyzed the broken
incentive chain that stops ISPs from participating DDoS defense. They argue that
the subscription-based pricing model among ISPs at the time, which often incur
over-provision and ignores the actual traffic volume pattern, discourages ISPs
from participating defense by doing extra work. They suggest that traffic-usage-
based pricing model would incentivize ISPs to help filtering out unwanted traffic.
Unfortunately, the authors did not consider the potential revenue that the ISPs
could have made by not participating in DDoS defense; therefore, as the Internet
gradually shift to usage-based pricing model, the apparent lack of incentive still
persist. Gill et al. (Gill, Schapira, and Goldberg (2011)) argues that efforts in
deploying more secure inter-domain routing protocol (i.e. S*BGP) would allow
the deployer to attract more inter-domain traffic, and thus generate more revenue,
matching results of early discussion in Sami, Katabi, Faratin, and Wroclawski
(2004). Different from DDoS defense, securing inter-domain routing does not
have negative incentive, i.e. not defending does not introducing extra revenue.
However, as the authors suggest, both strong early adopters and simplified protocol
are needed for global deployment. Shen et al. (Shen, Yan, and Kantola (2013))
studies the deployment incentive of their previous work using game-theory. They
model the deployment problem as a social dilemma, and suggest that ISPs can
be incentivized by combining the benefits of achieving public good, and potential
punishment for untrustworthy behavior. However, public good itself does not
provide strong enough motivation for private companies, and trust assessment and
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behavior punishment require enforcement from global central authorities, which is
not a realistic assumption under the context of current Internet.
Summary: To summarize, there lacks study that explores the incentives for
in-network DDoS filtering, leaving the incentives for deployment of such systems
unclear. More specifically, due to the collaborative nature of in-network traffic
filtering, the inter-dependent relationships among potential defenders is a key factor
when considering the incentives, and should the modeled and examined.
2.3 Strategies for In-network DDoS Traffic Filtering
Table 1. DDoS defense solution categorizations
Work Single-AS Multi-AS
PushBack SourceEnd Other
RADAR, Sahay et al. 2015,
SPIFFY, Bohatei X
ScoreForCore,
Mahajan et al. 2002,




Huici et al. 2007,
Argyraki et al. 2009
X
MiddlePolice,
Andersen et al. 2003,
Keromytis et al. 2004
X
Almost all in-network defense solutions require placement strategies to
decide where on the Internet to deploy traffic filters or defense measure. We
categorize existing in-network defense strategies into three categories: PushBack,
SourceEnd, and other (shown in Table 1).
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PushBack defense: We define PushBack defense algorithms as those
that start defense from a victim AS and expand the defense area to its upstream
ASes. Starting from the victim AS, PushBack allows each defending AS to
mitigate a portion of the attack traffic, and delegate the rest of the attack traffic
to its upstream ASes for further mitigation. The original PushBack style defense
propagation is introduced in the PushBack paper (Mahajan et al. (2002b)).
Although this work considers router-level defense propagation, the basic idea can
be applied to AS-level collaboration. Other distributed defense systems that stem
from the classic PushBack work, such as the work of Yau et al. (Yau, Lui, Liang,
and Yam (2005)) and ScoreForCore (Kalkan and Alagöz (2016)), follow the same
PushBack algorithm to defend against DDoS attacks.
SourceEnd defense: Different from a PushBack algorithm where the
defense initiated from the victim side, a SourceEnd algorithm attempts to select
the ASes that are the sources of the attack or close to the sources, and only fall
back on downstream ASes toward the victim if resources run out. D-WARD system
(Mirković, Prier, and Reiher (2002)), for example, installs rate-limiting rules at
border routers in source networks; COSSACK (Papadopoulos, Lindell, Mehringer,
Hussain, and Govindan (2003)) deploys countermeasures at the ASes of attacking
sources. Both are early works that employ the SourceEnd strategy. Later work such
as AITF (Argyraki and Cheriton (2005)) introduced the idea of propagating the
defense from the attacking sources to the victim, thereby providing more flexibility
for defense deployment. Specifically, authors of AITF also observed that the current
generation of routers have sufficient filtering resources to mitigate DDoS attacks as
long as the attack traffic was blocked close to the attacking sources. Furthermore,
AITF was also one of the earliest projects to study hardware rule space during
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defense. Later work from Huici et al. (Huici and Handley (2007)) and StopIt
(X. Liu et al. (2008)) enhance AITF by introducing security measures against
DDoS attacks on the defensive infrastructure itself. Unlike PushBack solutions,
prior to defending against the attack all SourceEnd solutions need to know the
attack topology ( i.e., the attack sources and their AS-level routes toward the
victim) for each DDoS victim
Systems without clear defense placement strategies: Besides the
aforementioned two categories, there also exist systems that provide DDoS defense
frameworks without clear placement strategies. Previous work from Keromytis et
al. (Keromytis, Misra, and Rubenstein (2004)) and Anderson (Andersen (2003))
introduced authentication nodes at key locations between the sender and the
receiver in order to filter out unwanted traffic. More recent work from Liu et
al. (Z. Liu, Jin, Hu, and Bailey (2016)) (MiddlePolice) utilizes SDN to measure
network congestion status, exchanges measurement among collaborating ASes to
discover congested links across the Internet, and then places traffic filters at the
routers within congested ASes. However, these works do not clearly state where on
the Internet the defense should happen, leaving the decisions to the operators or
other algorithms. Without a detailed defense strategy, it is difficult to judge how
these systems perform under different DDoS attacks.
Summary: Although many in-network DDoS defense solutions have been
proposed, it still remains difficult for a victim to select suitable defense solutions
against specific DDoS attacks. The in-network defense solutions (such as DefCOM
Oikonomou et al. (2006), PushBack (Mahajan et al. (2002b)), and MiddlePolice
Z. Liu et al. (2016)) vary greatly in resource requirements, training data needed,
and expected efficiency. Selecting a sub-optimal defense solution could introduce
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substantial cost and even result in unsuccessful defense. However, there is no
quantitative study on how the solutions compare to each other, nor a general
model that describes these solutions in a common language. Further, it is also
unknown how these solutions perform under insufficient knowledge of the attacks or
against intelligent adversaries who can dynamically revise their attack strategies to
escape defense. Without a quantitative comparison, it is hard for a DDoS victim to
select the most suitable solution to achieve its defense goal and meet the resource
requirements.
2.4 Systems for In-network DDoS Traffic Filtering
In this section, we survey the designs and evaluations of historical and state-
of-the-art DDoS traffic filtering systems.
The obvious drawbacks with solutions at the edge led to various in-network
DDoS defense solutions. Methods such as PushBack (Mahajan et al. (2002a)),
TVA (Yang et al. (2008)), RAD (Kline et al. (2009)), AITF (Argyraki and
Cheriton (2005)), DefCOM (Oikonomou et al. (2006)), and StopIt (X. Liu et al.
(2008)) have proposed approaches to defend at multiple relevant remote ISPs. A
major concern with these approaches is their deployability: as they require either
router modification (Pushback, TVA, StopIT) or packet marking (RAD, AITF,
DefCOM, StopIT). While router modification is clearly an obstacle for deployment,
packet marking is also not practical in the modern Internet and causes switching
performance penalty.
In response to the sharp increase in the number and scale of DDoS attacks,
the scrubbing center approach, which is readily deployable, has gained popularity
in recent years. It redirects all incoming traffic for a customer to scrubbing centers,
processes and cleans the traffic there, and then forwards DDoS-free traffic back to
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the customer. Companies like Arbor Networks, CloudFlare, or Akamai, all offer
cloud-based DDoS-scrubbing service as well as possibly other proprietary on-site
solutions (Akamai DDoS Protection Service (2016); DDoS Protection By Arbor
Networks APS (2016)). Currently, scrubbing centers mainly employ proprietary
DDoS filtering algorithms, rather then enforcing victim-driven rules or policies
(Z. Liu et al. (2016)). Besides incurring extra overhead via DNS or BGP to reroute
traffic to scrubbing centers, it has also been shown that a clever attack can bypass
the scrubbing centers (Miu et al. (2013); Vissers, Van Goethem, Joosen, and
Nikiforakis (2015)).
The advent of SDN, due to its friendliness to deploying rules to filter traffic,
has also led to a variety of SDN-based DDoS defense solutions, including (Fayaz
et al. (2015); Sahay et al. (2015); Wang, Zheng, Lou, and Hou (2015)). Although
both approaches in Sahay et al. (2015) and Wang et al. (2015) populate SDN
switches with DDoS-filtering rules, little information is offered how they generate
such rules. The Bohatei approach in (Fayaz et al. (2015)), on the other hand,
assumes the ISP has a predefined library of defenses specifying a defense strategy
for each attack type, and deploys virtual machines of appropriate type, number
and location according to the current DDoS type. Much is yet to be done to ensure
SDN switches are instructed to deploy the right DDoS traffic filtering rules, at the
right time at the right locations, while achieving multiple potentially conflicting
objectives for both rule generation and placement. In most of these work, the
responsibility of filtering traffic is shared among multiple network devices that are
located either within the same network or different networks through collaboration.
Clearly, neither defense at the edge nor in-network defense can address the
DDoS problem alone, and researchers, including us, have noticed the disconnection
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between the edge and the in-network filtering capabilities. In following the
paradigm of filtering in network but receiving commands from the edge (i.e. the
victim), several approaches have appeared in recent years. There are existing
DDoS solutions that allow end-users to play a role in their own However, these
works do not address the problem of generating and placing traffic-filtering rules.
MiddlePolice (Z. Liu et al. (2016)) diverts traffic to traffic policing units referred
as mboxes that uses an information table to police traffic flows; in particular,
in order to mitigate DDoS, it enables a DDoS victim to send the mboxes traffic
control policies to dictate how bandwidth should be allocated among flows to
the victim. SENSS (Ramanathan, Mirkovic, Yu, and Zhang (2018)) instead has
the victim send specific filtering requests to SENSS servers running at ISPs in
order to filter traffic en route toward the victim. Stellar (Dietzel, Wichtlhuber,
Smaragdakis, and Feldmann (2018)) uses so called Advanced Blackholing to allow
ASes to send blackholing rules to their IXPs to filter DDoS traffic toward them.
These approaches use different in-network filtering entities, but they are all victim-
driven. However, unlike DrawBridge that generates rules for effective DDoS filtering
with minimal collateral damage and low filtering overhead, these approaches do
not employ a similar mechanism. While in MiddlePolice a victim can issue traffic
control policies and in SENSS a victim can issue filtering requests, there is no
discussion what policies or requests can achieve the best efficacy of DDoS filtering
with minimal collateral damage and low overhead, and neither do they generate
such policies or requests. In Stellar, when a victim issues rules, the system can limit
their collateral damage by increasing their granularity, but doing so would quickly
increase the number of rules. Also, unlike DrawBridge that chooses strategic in-
network filtering locations by considering their filtering capabilities and various
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attributes, in MiddlePolice a victim is simply bound with certain mboxes, in
SENSS a victim simply talks to SENSS servers known to the victim, and in Stellar
a victim simply uses available IXPs. Other systems like source-end approaches are
less popular due to the difficulties to locate a large number of DDoS sources and
deploy defenses against them; example solutions include D-WARD (Mirković et al.
(2002)), which installs rate-limiting filters at border routers in source networks, and
COSSACK (Papadopoulos et al. (2003)), which deploys countermeasures at the
ASes of attacking sources.
Summary: In summary, there currently lacks design and evaluation of in-
network traffic filtering systems that both respect flexible user input to control the
defense, and can effectively deploy traffic filters at optimal locations. Many existing
solutions for in-network traffic filtering only focusing on providing communication




INCENTIVES FOR IN-NETWORK DDOS TRAFFIC FILTERING
To study the in-network DDoS traffic filtering, we first need to investigate
whether networks have any incentives to participate in such defenses at all. In this
chapter, we develop a game-theoretical model that describes the interactions among
the Internet service providers and between customers. Through both static and
dynamic simulation, we discover that networks on the Internet in general can be
incentivized to participate in in-network traffic filtering.
This chapter is directly derived from Zhang, Wu, et al. (2019), resulted from
collaboration with other co-authors listed in the manuscript. Mingwei Zhang is the
primary author of this work, including co-designing and evaluating the incentive
mechanisms for in-network DDoS filtering.
3.1 Overview
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks have become increasingly more
frequent and powerful. The scale of recent DDoS attacks have reached over one
Terabit per second from tens of thousands of unique attack sources. The traditional
edge filtering solutions can no longer handle the situation, and in-network filtering
solutions are called upon which involve multiple Internet service providers (ISPs)
to collaboratively defend against the attacks. While collaborative defense solutions
can be more effective in stopping large-scale attacks from a technical perspective,
the incentives of the ISPs to deploy these solutions are left unexplored. Without
proper incentives for participation, in-network style traffic filtering solutions cannot
be effectively applied to due to the lack of participation from networks that are
involved forwarding DDoS traffic.
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In this chapter, we develop a game-theoretical model to capture the
economic benefits and costs of deploying in-network filtering solutions for the
ISPs who are competing for customers. Through large-scale simulations at the
Internet level, we have the following observations: the majority of the providers
on the Internet have economic incentive to participate in DDoS defense driven by
competition; and the severity of DDoS attacks and the level of competitions impact
the charge for filtering DDoS traffic a provider can impose on its customers. To our
best knowledge, this is the first study examines the incentives for the deployment of
in-network filtering solutions.
Scope of This Chapter:
This chapter investigates the incentives for ISPs in-network filter DDoS
traffic from economics angle using game-theory and simulations. This chapter
creates theoretical base for the further studies on the topic of in-network DDoS
traffic filtering. Chapter IV studies the filter placement strategies and chapter V
examines different aspects on system design, both of which uses the results
from this chapter to support the assumption that multiple ISPs on the Internet
collaborate together for DDoS traffic filtering.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 In-network Filtering of DDoS Traffic. Distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attack has been plaguing the Internet for more than a decade
now. DDoS attacks utilize a large number of attacking sources (e.g. compromised
computers) to flood the victims’ networks with unwanted traffic to exhaust the
victims’ network, computation, and other types of resources. Recent DDoS attacks
have reached a record-high 1.2 Terabit per second (Kottler (2018)), which can pose
severe threat to all online services.
28
Traditionally, the DDoS defense is considered edge defense, in which either
the DDoS victim, or a third-party entity is entrusted to conducts the defense,
and the defense happens at the edge of the Internet. Multiple problems stops
edge defense from effectively filtering DDoS attacks traffic. First, the cost is
usually very high for any one single entity to handle Terabit-per-second-level DDoS
attack traffic as suggested in Lumbis et al. (2014); Pagiamtzis and Sheikholeslami
(2006). Making things worse, the attackers can now more easily tap to increasingly
popular yet less secure Internet-of-Things devices to launch attacks with record-
high volume. Secondly, even with sufficient investment on handling incoming
DDoS traffic at the edge, the defense, in many cases, can already be late due to
traffic congestion that happens before reaching the edge. It is not uncommon to
see traffic congestion happen before reaching the victim, and work in Kang et al.
(2013) revealed attacks that triggers congestion around the victim without directly
launch attacks at the victim. Edge defense cannot sufficiently handle such cases,
and people turn to in-network defense solutions.
In-network DDoS defense, as suggested by the name, places the defense
efforts inside the Internet, along the paths of the DDoS attack traffic. It has the
following advantages over edge defense. First, in-network defense allows sharing of
the defense load, reducing the defense efforts required at each defending entity.
Defenders carry less burden, and can achieve higher overall defense capacity
Second, the filtering of DDoS traffic can happen earlier, reducing the traffic load
along way to the victim, thus mitigating the traffic congestion on the links before
reaching the victim. Overall, in-network DDoS defense becomes more suitable and
efficient than edge defenses in current Internet environment.
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3.2.2 ISPs Lack Incentives to Filter. Although technically
feasible, it is, however, still unknown if in-network traffic filtering mechanisms are
economically beneficial to the collaborators. In edge-defense cases, the defender
is either the victim or directly serving the victim, making the incentive of defense
clear. However, for ASes involved in-network defense, the incentive on participating
in defense in unclear. Filtering DDoS traffic towards its customers would decrease
an ISP’s profit due to the reduction of the amount of traffic forwarded. If an ISP is
the sole provider for its customers, it is always in the ISP’s best interest to forward
as much traffic as possible as long as revenues exceed costs. This creates a conflict
where customers want provider to filter DDoS traffic, while providers want to
continue forwarding such traffic to profit. Without proper incentives, it can seem
daunting to convince service providers to give up on that portion of profit for the
good of others.
3.2.3 Competition Creates Incentives. Fortunately, as the Internet
infrastructure grows, hardly any single ISP can monopolize the entire service
market. Instead, ISPs face competition. Customers who pay for the Internet access
would expect non-interrupted services and they would naturally choose the ISP
who exerts the most efforts on stopping or mitigating incoming DDoS attacks.
Given competition, the benefits of an ISP investing in DDoS defense
becomes clear. By investing a higher effort on DDoS defense, an ISP has a
higher chance of being selected by customers among its competitors and the
right of carrying the traffic for customers yields revenues. However, providing
DDoS defense service does not come without its costs. First, an ISP would lose
revenues by dropping the DDoS traffic that would have traveled to the customers.
Second, deploying new defense solutions is costly, both in terms of equipment and
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maintenance costs. The benefits of becoming the winner of the competition provide
an incentive to the ISPs to invest efforts. However, it is also possible for an ISP to
refrain itself from competition given the potential loss of revenues and the increase
of workloads and expenses.
3.2.4 Related Studies. There are abundant work studying address
cyber-security problems from both incentive and game-theoretical perspectives
surveyed in Laszka et al. (2014); Manshaei et al. (2013); Papadimitriou (2001);
Roy et al. (2010).
Some projects have explored using game-theory to study interactions
between attackers and defenders in cyber-security context, such as in Bedi et al.
(2011); Bohawek et al. (2007); Shiva et al. (2010); Wu et al. (2010). However, all
work above try to model and develop systems to mitigate attacks (which can be
intelligent and dynamic) from a single central-controlled entity, none is directly
applicable in the in-network filtering context.
There are studies that investigate the potential collaboration among
defenders against cyber-attacks, as presented in Grossklags et al. (2008a, 2008b);
Miura-Ko et al. (2008). However, the lack of quantitative evaluation using real-
world network topology and attacks making them less applicable on real-world
problems.
Some more closely related studies focus on deployment incentives for cyber-
security solutions. Early work by Huang et al. Huang et al. (2007) suggested
that traffic-usage-based pricing model would incentivize ISPs to help filtering out
unwanted traffic. Unfortunately, the authors did not consider the potential revenue
that the ISPs could have made by not participating in DDoS defense; therefore,
as the Internet gradually shift to usage-based pricing model, the apparent lack
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of incentive still persist. In Gill et al. (2011) the authors argue that efforts in
deploying more secure inter-domain routing protocol (i.e. S*BGP) would allow
the deployer to attract more inter-domain traffic. Different from DDoS defense,
securing inter-domain routing does not have negative incentive, i.e. not defending
does not introducing extra revenue, thus the results are not directly applicable.
In Shen et al. (2013) the authors argue that ISPs can be incentivized by combining
the benefits of achieving public good, and potential punishment for untrustworthy
behavior. However, public good itself does not provide strong enough motivation
for private companies, and trust assessment and behavior punishment require
enforcement from global central authorities, which is not a realistic assumption
under the context of current Internet.
3.3 Game of Traffic: DDoS Defense Investment
When a customer AS selects its provider, the effectiveness of the potential
provider’s protection against potential DDoS attacks is an important factor as the
large-scale attacks becomes more frequent and devastating. As a provider AS, when
it invests in DDoS defense, it affects not only the profit of itself, but also could
affects its current and potential customers’ provider choice, thus also affects the
profits of its competitors. In this section, we introduce a game theoretical model to
capture the strategic interactions and their effects among the ASes on the Internet.
3.3.1 Network Modeling.
3.3.1.1 Internet Topology. We consider the Internet as a weighted-
directed graph G = {V,E}. V represents the set of all nodes (vertices) in the graph
and E represents the set of all edges in the graph. Each node vi ∈ V represents
an autonomous system (AS) on the Internet. Each edge ei,j ∈ E represents the
inter-AS directional link between two neighboring ASes vi and vj.
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Figure 5. An example of DDoS attack with multiple routes to reach the victim.
ASes on the Internet forms business relationships to establish links (both
physically and topologically) to connect themselves with other entities and
further with the rest of the Internet. There are three common types of business
relationships between the ASes as summarized in Gao (2001): customer-to-provider,
peer-to-peer, and sibling-to-sibling. In a customer-to-provider relationship, the
provider AS carries traffic from and to the customer AS, and the customer AS pays
its provider AS for the traffic the provider carries for it. In peer-to-peer sibling-to-
sibling relationships, two ASes forward traffic for each other usually free of charge.
In this study, we mainly consider the ASes with customer-to-provider relationship.
For an IP prefix (or IP block) to be reachable, the owner AS must announce
the block to the Internet using Boarder Gateway Protocol (BGP). The prefix
reachability information is then propagated hop by hop through out the Internet
between each pair of neighboring ASes. Upon receiving a propagated paths toward
certain prefix, an AS decides whether to use the path and which neighbors it should
propagate to.
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Based on the AS-level relationship, each AS decides which paths it will
take to reach other ASes, and propagates its decisions to its neighboring ASes, the
result of which is a fully-connected Internet. Figure 5 shows a simple example of a
DDoS attack where the attack traffic can have multiple routes to reach the victim
depending on the provider the victim chooses. If the victim chooses provider 1 as
its provider, it will announce its prefixes via provider 1, and as a result the rest of
the Internet (including DDoS attackers) can reach the victim via provider 1.
3.3.1.2 DDoS Attack Model. We model the DDoS attacks as the
following. First, DDoS attacks can originate from any AS v ∈ V on the Internet
and can happen at any time. We define the set of the attack source ASes as
SRC = {vs1, vs2, .., vsn},
where vsi is the ith attack source AS, and SRC ⊂ V . A DDoS attacker controls
large botnets to launch the attacks, thus the size of the set SRC is usually very
large. Second, assume that any AS on the Internet can also be a victim of DDoS
attacks.
3.3.1.3 DDoS Defense Model. There are multiple ways to defend
against DDoS attacks. The defense can happen at the victim side or any third-
party AS that defend for the victim; it can also be carried out by multiple ASes
on the paths of the attack traffic. In this study, we allow any AS on the Internet
to participate in DDoS defense efforts, assuming that the means of communicating
defense details is available to all ASes.
3.3.2 A Game Theoretical Model of Provider Selection. In
this subsection, we mathematically describe the likelihood of an AS winning over
customers from a game theoretical perspective.
There are two key entities in the model:
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– Customer ASes who pays for Internet connection to providers but can
select which providers to use;
– Provider ASes who provides Internet connection as well as DDoS protection
service.
The provider ASes who shares potential customers compete with each other for
the customers, and the customers chooses their Internet providers independently.
We study the worst-case scenario DDoS attacks, i.e. globally-distributed long-term
attacks, and consider the attack sources as an input of the model. Peer/sibling
ASes do not have influences on the game, and thus are also considered as an input
of the model.
3.3.2.1 Customer ASes. As the Internet infrastructure grows, it is
common for customer ASes to have multiple provider ASes to select from. This
naturally generates competitions among all the providers ASes. In the context of
frequent DDoS attacks, DDoS defense becomes a key criterion for provider selection
due to the following reasons. It is a common practice that a provider AS charges a
customer AS by the 95% of the peak traffic volume (i.e. 95th percentile bandwidth
metering). Frequent DDoS attacks can easily impose significantly higher costs to
any downstream customer ASes that have to carry the traffic. A rational customer
AS would select the provider AS who provide services with lower cost, with the
consideration of the charges involved in forwarding and filtering DDoS traffic by the
provider.
3.3.2.2 Provider ASes. Provider ASes are driven by profit it can
make. If a provider faces competition over customers, the provider with a better
DDoS defense capability would be more likely to win the competition and carry the
traffic for the customers. The losing ASes would then lose all the potential profit
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that could have generated from the lost customer ASes. The provider also does
not filter traffic for free for customers. In this study, we assume that each provider
charges its customers for both forwarding normal traffic and filtering unwanted
traffic.
3.3.3 A Game Theoretical Model of Provider Selection. In
this subsection, we mathematically describe the likelihood of an AS winning over
customers from a game theoretical perspective.
First, let us consider an example where two provider ASes v1 and v2
compete for a customer vc. When under DDoS attack, the customer AS vc receives
total of Tc,ddos DDoS traffic and Tc,normal normal traffic. Provider v1 and v2 each
need to make a decision on 1) whether it is providing DDoS filtering service, and
2) how much it would charge for filtering DDoS traffic. A provider charges its
customer for forwarding traffic (the rate of which denoted as rforward), as well as
filtering DDoS traffic if it decides to participate in defense (charges at the rate of
rfilter). If v1 decides to participate in defense, it would charge the customer at the
rate of
r1,c = rforward ∗ Tc,normal + rfilter ∗ Tc,ddos,
i.e. charge the forwarding of normal traffic and filtering of DDoS traffic separately
at different rates. Respectively, if provider v2 decides not to participate in DDoS
defense, it would charge its customer at the rate of
r2,c = rforward ∗ (Tc,normal + Tc,ddos),
i.e. charge forwarding of both normal and DDoS traffic at the same forwarding rate.
Based on the charges by its providers (i.e. r1,c and r2,c), the customer AS vc
decides v1 or v2 as its provider. Naturally, the customer would choose the provider
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with lower charge. However, the customer is likely to make errors when evaluating
the values r1,c and r2,c due to imperfect estimation of its normal and DDoS traffic.
This is called the bounded rationality assumption, which is wildly adopted in the
recent economics literature to capture the empirical fact that decision makers
are not necessarily perfectly rational (see for example in McKelvey and Palfrey
(1995) and Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2005)). Given the errors and misinformation,
the customer is making a probabilistic choice over the two providers instead of
a deterministic one. That is, the customer chooses the provider with the higher
expected filter rate with a higher probability.
Suppose that the customer’s learned charge rate of provider v1’s filtered
traffic is given by r1,c + ε1, and that of provider v2’s filtered traffic is given
by r2,c + ε2, where ε1 and ε2 are two independent noise terms. A common
assumption is that these noise terms are extreme value distributed (usually
double exponentially) (see Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2002), Durlauf and Ioannides
(2010), Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman (2015), among many others). This
assumption will result in that the difference of the two noise terms is logistically
distributed, (See McFadden (1973), Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992), Blume
(1993), Brock (1993) for discussions on the importance of logistic models in
economics.)
Prob(ε1 − ε2 ≤ x) =
1
1 + e−λx
, where λ is a parameter that measures the “noisiness” of the two noise terms. As λ
increases, the customer’s learned values are more precise. As a result, the customer
would choose v1 over v2 if the customer believes that v1 charges higher than v2, and
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that translates to
r1,c + ε1 > r2,c + ε2




This calculation can be extended to multiple provider ASes scenarios. We
define the set of all potential provider ASes of customer vc as Pc. The probability of






For every customer AS vc, we have
sumi∈SPiProbi(c) = 1
. Equation (3.1) allows us to calculate the chance of an AS provider winning the
right to carry a customer’s traffic.
3.3.4 Profit calculation. We assume that each provider AS
tries to maximize its profit by taking the competition we described above into
consideration.
As an example, let us consider two ASes: vp and vc. ip is a potential
provider of vc, and vc will make a decision on whether to use vp as its provider
based on the estimated charge rp,c. The total amount of normal traffic that vc
needs a provider to carry is given by Tc,normal, and the total amount of DDoS traffic
that is faced by vc is given by Tc,ddos. If vc is chosen to be the provider (winning the
competition), The expected profit of vp made from vc is thus given by
Profitp,c = Probp(c)× rp,c
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, which equals the probability that vp is chosen by vc as the provider times the rate
the provider vp charges. Note that increasing charge rate rp,c has two opposing
effects: decreasing vp’s probability of winning the competition due to higher charge,
but also increasing vp’s profit on handling the traffic for vc if selected to be the
provider.






, where Cp is the set of all potential customer ASes of vp.
3.3.5 Cost of defense. Deploying DDoS defense also incurs costs to a
provider AS. We define the total defense cost function for an AS as
Costi = Costequip(Ti,filter) + Costlabor(|Ci|),
where Costequip(Ti,filter) is the equipment cost for filtering the DDoS traffic for a
traffic rate of Ti,filter, and Costlabor(|Ci|) is the labor cost for maintaining all its
customers.
3.3.6 Assumptions. We make a few assumptions in this study. In
the rest of this section, we will describe the assumptions and the retionales behind
them.
Provider ASes have similar performance features : We assume provider
ASes have similar performance features, and the only differentiator during the
competition is the decison on whether to particiate in in-network filtering, and if
so the rate that it would charge for filtering corresponding DDoS traffic. In this
study we focus on the economics aspects of the competition where customers prefer
providers with lower charges under DDoS attacks. Other performance metrics such
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as bandwidth provided and peering locations are ignored will be considered in the
future study.
Providers try to maximize their profit : During the competition, we also
assume that each provider tries to maximize their profit, and does not try tactics
that might cause loss of profit to gain customers. In the future study, we may
include more complex models to capture other actions a provider might take to
outperform its competitors.
Costs of in-network fitlering patiticipation are the same for all providers :
For simplicity, we also assume the equipment and labor cost functions are the
same across all ASes. We assume that Cequip increases as the overall traffic to filter
increases, and Clabor increases when an provider AS has more customer ASes.
3.4 Simulation Design
In the previous section, we have described our modeling of the incentives
of ASes on deploying DDoS defense systems. To study the real-world indication
of the model, we design a simulation system that allows us to simulate the DDoS
defense decisions of ASes on the Internet and explore the outcomes. Designing and
implementing a simulation system with more than 60,000 interconnected entities is
not a trivial task. In this section, we describe our design of the simulation system
and explain how the system can help us explore the defense decision outcomes.
3.4.1 Simulation Setup.
3.4.1.1 Customer-Provider Pairs. The simulation relies on the
full Internet topology to study all possible interactions among the provider ASes
and their potential customers on the Internet. The topology include not only
the current links (relationships) between ASes, but also all possible/potential
relationships that might be established. Ideally, we would like to know: for each
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AS, what neighboring (directly connected) ASes does it have and could have,
including the relationships with them. However, the relationship information is
considered private and often concealed by ASes, even for the current established
ones. To best estimate the current and potential relationships between ASes, we
use CAIDA AS relationship data (CAIDA (2019); Luckie, Huffaker, Dhamdhere,
Giotsas, et al. (2013)) of the past 10 years to compile a relatively comprehensive
inter-connection information for the whole Internet.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of providers ASes of different tiers with
different number of competitors and customers. From both figures we can see that
over 80% of the providers have less than 10 competitors/customers, while over 95%
providers have less than 100 competitors/customers. We can also see that Tier-
3, Tier-2, and Tier-1 ASes have increasingly more customers and competitors.
The severity of competitions could potentially affect the filtering participation
decisions for providers, and we will study the effects using dynamic simulation in
Section 3.5.3.3.
3.4.1.2 Traffic Estimation. We also use full routing tables from
all collectors from RIPE RIS (RIPE RIS (2019)) and RouteViews (University of
Oregon (2019)) to construct a best-effort Internet topology. The connected peer
routers are considered traffic originators in the simulation for both DDoS traffic and
normal traffic. Using that, we estimate the relative amount of traffic for each AS,
and use that as base unit for profit calculation (see Section 3.3).
3.4.1.3 Provider AS’s Action Options. Each provider AS
has multiple action options when optimizing its profit. One can choose not to
participate in defense, and thus charge forwarding both normal and DDoS traffic
the same rate. One can also choose to participate in DDoS defense, and charge
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(a) CDF of number of customers.















(b) CDF of number of competitors.
Figure 6. CDF of number of customers and competitors for provider ASes in the
dataset.
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Table 2. Simulation parameters and their value ranges.
parameter meaning value range
ddos_ratio Ratio of volume between
DDoS and normal traffic
0.0 – 1.0
do_defense Whether an AS participate
in DDoS attack
true / false
filter_charge If defend, how much it
charges for filtering traffic
0.0 – 1.0
forwarding normal traffic at regular rate, and charge filtering of DDoS traffic at a
fraction of the regular rate, ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. When the filtering charge rate
at 0.0, it indicates that the AS provide DDoS defense service free of charge; when
the filtering charge rate at 1.0, the provider charges filtering traffic as much as
forwarding it; any filtering charge beyond 1.0 would make filtering more expensive
than forwarding for the customer, and we do not consider those cases in this study.
Table 2 summarizes the parameters and their corresponding value ranges.
3.4.1.4 DDoS Traffic Ratio. Another important factor that could
affect the providers’ defense decisions is severity of the DDoS attacks their
customers are seeing. We define the term ddos_ratio as the ratio DDoS attack
traffic as compared to normal legitimate traffic to/from a customer AS. In this
study, we range the DDoS ratio from 0.5, i.e. the volume of DDoS traffic is half
of the normal traffic, to 5.0, i.e. the DDoS traffic is five times as large as the normal
traffic.
3.4.2 Static Simulation. In a static simulation, each provider AS
makes a decision on defense based on its competitors initial states. Once the
decision is made, no more adjustment is considered. Specifically, we study the profit
changes for each provider AS on the Internet when it switches from not defending
to defending. We consider two scenarios in this study: first AS to participate in
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Algorithm 1 Static simulation algorithm.
Require: V = {vi|vi is an AS} . set of all ASes
Require: A = {ai|ai is an defense option} . set of defense options
Require: D = θ . set of defense decisions
1: procedure StaticSim(V,A,D)
2: # first-one-to-deploy scenario
3: for vi ∈ V do
4: # calculate options
5: for ak ∈ A do
6: for vj is a customer of vi do
7: set competitors to no defense







13: # last-one-to-deploy scenario
14: for vi ∈ V do
15: # calculate options
16: for ak ∈ A do
17: for vj is a customer of vi do
18: set competitors to defend at fixed charge








defense among competitors (or first-one-to-deploy); last AS to participate in defense
among competitors (or last-one-to-deploy). The first scenario reveals how likely
the defense solutions can be adopted in the early stage; while the second scenario
reveals how defense decisions can drive competitors defense decision. For each
provider AS, we exhaust all defense options (from no-defense to defense at different
charge rates), and calculate the expected profit if the provider in question option to
one of the option under the two scenarios. in each scenario, we also examines the
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Algorithm 2 Dynamic simulation algorithm.
Require: V = {vi|vi is an AS} . set of all ASes
Require: A = {ai|ai is an defense option} . set of defense options
Require: D = {ai|ai ∈ A and vi ∈ V } . set of defense decisions
Require: D′ == θ . set of previous decisions
Require: isConverged =false . convergence indicator
1: procedure DynamicSym(V,A,D,D′)
2: while !isConverged do
3: # update defense decisions
4: for vi ∈ V do
5: # calculate options
6: for vj is a customer of vi do
7: for ak ∈ A do
8: calculate probability Probi(j, ak)
9: end for
10: end for
11: # find best action
12: Di = ak where maxak∈A Profiti
13: end for
14: # test convergence
15: if D == D′ then
16: isConverged = true
17: else
18: D′ ← D




total number of providers who can at certain charge rate gain profits comparing to
not participating in defense.
3.4.3 Dynamic Simulation. The simulation runs multiple rounds of
decision making for all ASes. In each round, every AS will choose a defense effort
that can optimize its profit based on the knowledge of its competitors’ defense
efforts from the previous round. We call such a decision rule used by the ASes, the
myopic best response rule, because each AS chooses the optimal effort level without
incorporating its competitors’ strategic changes.
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Given a configuration, we want to use the simulation to find the Nash
equilibrium of the game. The equilibrium (or convergence) state represents the
status where there is no individual players would like to change its effort level
unilaterally. The detailed steps are as follows.
We initiate all ASes by setting their defense preference to no-defense. Based
on equation 3.1, each provider AS calculates its probability of being selected by
its potential customers for each action choice it has. Using the customer-winning
probabilities, the simulation system re-calculate the expected profit of a provider
AS given that the AS would choose the option that can maximize the winning
probability. After all ASes have updated their decisions, the simulation determines
if it has converges, i.e. if any AS have made difference decisions comparing to the
previous round. If the simulation has not converged, it will continue the previous
procedure and update defense efforts for all ASes. If the simulation has converged,
it will then produce the report of the final states for all ASes. See Algorithm 2 for
more details.
3.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we will discuss the simulation results. As discussed in 3.4, we
divide the simulation into two types:
– static simulation, where only the AS under study can change its defense
configuration, while other ASes, especially competitors, stays static;
– dynamic simulation, where every AS can change its configuration to pursue
higher profit.
The static simulation shows a snapshot of ASes’ responses under fixed



















(a) Percentage of providers can gain profit.












(b) Number of profitable providers.
Figure 7. Profitable first-one-to-deploy providers.
defense choices and whether the simulation achieves equilibrium. We study these
scenarios also with different DDoS-to-normal traffic ratio (ddos_ratio), ranging
from 0.5 (i.e. DDoS traffic’s volume is half of the normal traffic) to 5.0 (i.e. DDoS
traffic is five times as large as normal traffic). Each provider AS who decides to
defend also can select different charge rate for processing and filtering DDoS traffic
(filter_charge).
3.5.1 Static Simulation. We first examine the incentives of provider



















(a) Percentage of providers can gain profit.












(b) Number of profitable providers at different
charge rate.
Figure 8. Profitable last-one-to-deploy providers.
changes for each provider AS on the Internet when it switches from not defending
to defending. We consider two scenarios in this study: first AS to participate in
defense among competitors (or first-one-to-deploy); last AS to participate in defense
among competitors (or last-one-to-deploy). The first scenario reveals how likely
the defense solutions can be adopted in the early stage; while the second scenario
reveals how defense decisions can drive competitors defense decision.
Figure 7 shows the results for the first-one-to-deploy scenario. We first
examine how many providers can make positive profit gain when they switch
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from no-defense to defense. Figure 7a shows the percentage of all provider ASes
that can gain profit by switching to defense at certain filter charge. It indicates
that almost all provider ASes can at least make extra profit at some filter charge.
Figure 7b further reveals at what charge does most of the provider ASes can gain
profit by switching. It clearly shows that the number of profitable providers peak
at different filter charge; and as the DDoS becomes more severe, the peak of filter
charge increases.
Figure 8 shows the results for the last-one-to-deploy scenario. Figure 7a
shows that almost all provider ASes can gain profit at some filter charge, but there
are less profitable providers when DDoS volume is low (i.e. ddos_ratio = 0.5).
We further study at what charge does most of the provider ASes can gain profit
by switching when all competitors are defending with 0.5 filter charge. Figure 7b
shows that most of the providers can gain profit when it charges slightly less than
the competitors (i.e. 0.4 as opposed to 0.5). Different from the previous scenario, it
also shows that the severity of DDoS attacks (i.e. ddos_ratio) does not significantly
affect the profitability of an AS when its competitors all defend.
From both results, we can see that when provided freedom to compensate
DDoS defense costs by charging for filtering efforts, the majority of the providers
on the Internet can find some charge rate that allow the them to gain profits by
providing filtering services. If a provider is the first to provide services, the amount
of DDoS traffic ratio affects how much it should charge to maximize profits; on the
other hand, if a provider joins defense the last, no matter how severe the DDoS
attacks are, the profitability is significantly decided by its competitor’s choice. In
most cases, charging similarly or slightly less comparing to the competitor would
result in the best profits for the majority of the providers. In other words, charging
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too much would risk losing the customers altogether, while charging too little would
make the provider miss large portion of the profit that it could make.
3.5.2 Individual Provider Profit Patterns. The previous study
focused on overall statistics of the providers who can gain profit by switching to
participating in defense. We also study how each individual AS’s profit may change
when different filter_charge is selected.
Figure 9 and Figure 10 shows four different types of profit patterns:
– bell-shape profit curve with gain;
– bell-shape profit curve without gain;
– increasing profit curve;
– decreasing profit curve.
We will discuss these types of profit patterns and their indications in this section.
3.5.2.1 Bell-shape profit curve with gain. Figure 9a shows
AS37468’s profit value as the filter_charge changes when it participates in
defense. Comparing to the profit baseline when it does not participate in defense,
the bell-shaped profit value curve exceed the baseline between 0.1 and 0.5 and
peaks at 0.3. The AS procures more profit by increasing the filtering charge when
the charge is low (< 0.3), and less profit when the charge is higher (> 0.3). This
shows a clear example of diminishing returns Samuelson and Nordhaus (2001), and
indicates that the AS has incentive to participate in defense when the charge is set
properly.
3.5.2.2 Bell-shape profit curve without gain. Figure 9b shows
an similar profit pattern with diminishing returns, but with the peak of the profit
when defending lower than the baseline. This figure indicates that the AS in
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(a) Bell-shape profit curve (AS37468, 1.0 DDoS
ratio).















(b) Bell-shape profit curve but unprofitable
(AS25227, 1.0 DDoS ratio).
Figure 9. Number of providers gains profit by switching from not-defending to
defending.
question cannot make enough profit to justify switching to DDoS defense regardless
of the filter_charge choices.
3.5.2.3 Increasing profit curve. The increasing profit curve
(Figure 10a) indicate that the ASes has yet to reach their peak profit even they
charges at 1.0 rate. This pattern shows that these ASes face less competitions that
compete by charge prices (such as provider ASes that has customers that have no
other potential providers).
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(a) Increasing profit curve (AS46455, 1.0 DDoS
ratio).













(b) Decreasing profit curve (AS37468, 0.5 DDoS
ratio).
Figure 10. Number of providers gains profit by switching from not-defending to
defending.
3.5.2.4 Decreasing profit curve. The decreasing profit curve
(Figure 10b, after 0.1), on the other hand, indicate that the ASes has passed their
peak profit at low or almost no charge for filtering DDoS traffic. Such ASes tend
to have heavy competitions where charge high prices for defense would significantly
decrease chances of being selected by its potential customers.
3.5.3 Dynamic Simulation. We further study the decision of
provider ASes regarding DDoS defense in a more dynamic environment. In this
section, we examine the results for dynamic simulation, where every AS is making
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(a) Percentage of provider ASes participate in
filtering.





















(b) Percentage of provider ASes update charges.
Figure 11. Profitable providers when no competitors participate in defense.
decision dynamically based on their competitors’ decisions, and the procedure
repeats until the decisions converge.
3.5.3.1 Provider AS’s choices. At each round, a provider AS can
in general decide whether it would participate in DDoS defense or not based on its
overall profit calculation. When deciding its options, it calculates the profit as if
– it does not participate in defense;
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– or it participate in defense and charge filter_charge amount for processing
and filtering DDoS traffic.
The rate ranges between 0.0 to 1.0 with 0.1 as step. The AS will then select the
best option that maximize its profit based on calculation introduced in Sec. 3.3.4.
Note that its competitors’ current configuration (i.e. the results of their previous
decision) is incorporated during the profit calculation, and its decision will then
also affects its competitors future decision making.
3.5.3.2 Percentage of providers defending. We first examine the
number of provider ASes decided to participate in defense, given that each provider
AS is try to maximize their profit at each round. Figure 11 shows the summary
results for dynamic simulation in terms of provider participation and configuration
changes. Figure 11a show the percentage of provider ASes decided to participate
in defense at each round of the simulation. It is clear that very high number of
provider ASes decided to participate in the defense at the very first round, and the
numbers for different DDoS attack scenarios stay high and stable. This indicate
that in terms of defense participation, the simulation converges very fast and result
in high-level of participation for all provider ASes.
With almost all ASes participate in defense, do they alternate their defense
charges? Figure 11b shows that there is very little number of ASes update their
filter_charge configuration, and only appear in one of the simulation where
ddos_ratio = 1. Combining this result with results from Figure 11a, we can
conclude that given opportunity to freely change and optimize their defense
decisions, the majority of the provider ASes would choose to defense and
settle down on their filter_charge rates.
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Figure 12. Average charges.
3.5.3.3 Filter charges. Since the majority of the provider ASes
would choose to defense and settle down on filter_charge, the next question
becomes how much would they charge their customers to maximize their profit? To
answer this question, we further dig into the simulation results and examine each
individual ASes’ optimal charge and the overall distribution of the charge values.
Figure 12 shows the average filter_charge for all provider ASes that decide
to participate in defense under different DDoS traffic ratios. When DDoS attack
traffic is relatively low (i.e. < 0.5), the average charge for filtering traffic is around
0.5, meaning a provider AS charges its customer about half of the price for filtering
DDoS traffic than forwarding normal traffic. As the DDoS traffic volume increases,
the charge also increases to as high as about 0.8 when DDoS attack traffic is five
times stronger than normal traffic.
We further take a look at the distribution of the filter_charge for all
provider ASes under different severity of the DDoS attacks. Figure 13 and
Figure 14 show the histograms of the number of provider ASes with different
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(a) DDoS ratio = 0.5



















(b) DDoS ratio = 1.0
Figure 13. Provider ASes charge distribution.
filter_charge when the simulation converges. As we can see from the DDoS ratio
increases from 0.5 (Fig.13a), 1.0 (Fig.13b), 2.0 (Fig.14a), to 5.0 (Fig.14b), there
are 1) a group of ASes with lower charges that move to higher charges (which also
form a bell-shape in the figures), and 2) a consistent number of ASes (around 2,500
to 3,000) that always charges highest rate possible. To understand why there are
two groups of ASes that have different charge patterns, we examine every AS in
each group to reveal their inner correlations. Specifically, we use Fig.13a as an
example, and divide all provider ASes into two groups by their filter_charge: low
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(a) DDoS ratio = 2.0



















(b) DDoS ratio = 5.0
Figure 14. Provider ASes charge distribution.
filter_charge group where filter_charge < 0.5 and high filter_charge group
where filter_charge ≥ 0.5.
Figure 15 shows the CDF plots of the number of customers and competitors
for each group. It is clear that ASes with higher filter_charge have less customers
(Fig.15a) and less competitors (Fig.15b).
3.5.4 Summary. In this section, we investigate the incentive of
provider ASes on the Internet participating in DDoS defense by examining the
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(a) CDF of number of customers.













(b) CDF of number of competitors.
Figure 15. CDF of number of customers and competitors for provider ASes.
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profit each provider can make under different environment while the customer ASes
can freely choose the provider it select to use.
From the static simulation, we learned that most provider ASes can gain
profit by provider DDoS defense service to potential customers; providers reach
their peak expected profit with different charges for filtering traffic, which is
impacted by the severity of the DDoS attacks as well as their competitors’ defense
decisions.
Further dynamic simulation revealed that for most provider ASes, if
they choose to charge DDoS filtering that maximize their profit (assuming no
competitors are providing similar services), they all can reach their stable peak
profit and achieve a global stable status.
We also discovered that the number of competitors/customers have a strong
impact on how much they should charge for DDoS filtering to reach peak profit.
An AS can gain higher profit by charging more for DDoS filtering if it has weak
competitions; while an AS with strong competitions need to charge less for DDoS
filtering in order to win customers and gain higher profit.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a game-theoretical model that examines the
incentives of ASes to invest in efforts on DDoS defense. Based on the model, we
built a large-scale simulation system and examine 1) whether networks on the
Internet can be incentivized to participate in in-network traffic filtering, and 2) the
affects of a network’s topological location, level of competition, and the amount of
DDoS traffic it carries for its customer affects its decision on DDoS filtering efforts.
We observe the following patterns from the simulation results. The majority
of the provider ASes on the Internet can benefit from providing DDoS defense
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services to their customers if they can compensate the defense cost by charging
for filtering DDoS traffic. The severity of DDoS attacks affects the charge rate
a provider can place on its potential customers; if a provider sees higher volume
of DDoS traffic going through its potential customers, it would charge higher to
achieve its peak profit. The level of competition also drives the charge rate: a
provider with low-level competition can charge a high rate while still profitable;
a provider that faces strong competitions need to charge less to attract customers
for profit.
These observations provide confidence that if in-network collaborative
defense mechanisms mature enough provider ASes on the Internet would have
incentive to participate in DDoS defense. We believe that such observations can




FILTER PLACEMENT STRATEGIES FOR IN-NETWORK DDOS TRAFFIC
FILTERING
From Chapter III, we have learned that the majority of the networks on
the Internet can be incentivized to participate in in-network traffic filtering. With
confidence of the deployment incentives, we can assume larger number of networks
on the Internet can be utilized for in-network filtering purpose. Now the question
becomes: Given a set of filtering rules, in what locations should a defender place the
rules to achieve the maximum effectiveness on DDoS traffic filtering?
In this chapter, we survey the existing strategies for placing the rules,
summarize the existing solutions by developing a model that can describe all
strategies in the same framework, propose a new strategy that can outperform the
existing ones, and finally evaluate their performances using simulations based on
real-world Internet topology and DDoS attack traces.
This chapter is directly derived from Zhang, Shi, et al. (2019), resulted from
collaboration with other co-authors listed in Zhang, Shi, et al. (2019). Mingwei
Zhang is the primary author of this work, including co-designing and analyzing the
different in-network DDoS filtering strategies.
4.1 Overview
Research has shown that distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on
the Internet could often be better handled by enlisting the in-network defense of
multiple autonomous systems (ASes), rather than relying entirely on the victim’s
Internet Service Provider at the edge. Less noticed but important is the fact that
an in-network defense can also remove DDoS traffic from the Internet early en
route to the victim, thus decreasing the overall load on the Internet and reducing
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chances of link congestion. However, it is not well understood to what degree
different in-network defense strategies can achieve such benefits. In this chapter,
we model the existing two main categories of in-network DDoS defense algorithms
(PushBack, SourceEnd) and propose a new type of algorithm (StrategicPoints). In
particular, we compare their effectiveness in minimizing the amount of DDoS traffic
that the victim receives, their impact on reducing the DDoS traffic on the entire
Internet, and their resiliency against intelligent adversaries and dynamic attacks.
We detail how the comparison results vary according to parameters and provide our
insights on the pros and cons of these three categories of in-network DDoS defense
solutions.
4.2 Background
Researchers have put forward a number of in-network DDoS defense
solutions to handle very-large-scale DDoS attacks that happen increasingly more
frequently on the current Internet. Instead of defending at the edge, they defend
against DDoS attacks before the traffic reaches the victim, often when the DDoS
traffic is even further away from the victim’s network. These solutions often also
distribute the defending workload among a set of defensive collaborators, each in
charge of a portion of the traffic. Collectively, the set of collaborators are able to
handle a larger volume of DDoS traffic than any individual collaborator.
4.2.1 Lacks of Quantitative Comparisons. Although many in-
network DDoS defense solutions have been proposed, it still remains difficult for a
victim to select suitable defense solutions against specific DDoS attacks. The in-
network defense solutions (such as DefCOM (Oikonomou et al. (2006)), PushBack
(Mahajan et al. (2002b)), and MiddlePolice (Z. Liu et al. (2016))) vary greatly in
resource requirements, training data needed, and expected efficiency. Selecting a
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sub-optimal defense solution could introduce substantial cost and even result in
unsuccessful defense. However, there is no quantitative study on how the solutions
compare to each other, nor a general model that describes these solutions in a
common language. Further, it is also unknown how these solutions perform under
insufficient knowledge of the attacks or against intelligent adversaries who can
dynamically revise their attack strategies to escape defense. Without a quantitative
comparison, it is hard for a DDoS victim to select the most suitable solution to
achieve its defense goal and meet the resource requirements.
4.2.2 Existing Filtering Strategies. Almost all in-network defense
solutions require placement strategies to decide where on the Internet to deploy
traffic filters or defense measure. We categorize existing in-network defense
strategies into three categories: PushBack, SourceEnd, and other (shown in
Table 1). We will briefly recap the two types strategies here. For interested readers,
Chapter II contains for more details and information on solutions with no clear
filter placement strategies.
4.2.2.1 PushBack strategy. : We define PushBack defense algorithms
as those that start defense from a victim AS and expand the defense area to its
upstream ASes. Starting from the victim AS, PushBack allows each defending
AS to mitigate a portion of the attack traffic, and delegate the rest of the attack
traffic to its upstream ASes for further mitigation. The original PushBack style
defense propagation is introduced in the PushBack paper (Mahajan et al. (2002b)).
Although this work considers router-level defense propagation, the basic idea can be
applied to AS-level collaboration. Other distributed defense systems that stem from
the classic PushBack paper, such as the work of Yau et al. (Yau et al. (2005)) and
63
ScoreForCore (Kalkan and Alagöz (2016)), follow the same PushBack algorithm to
defend against DDoS attacks.
4.2.2.2 SourceEnd strategy. : Different from a PushBack algorithm
where the defense initiated from the victim side, a SourceEnd algorithm attempts
to select the ASes that are the sources of the attack or close to the sources, and
only fall back on downstream ASes toward the victim if resources run out. D-
WARD system (Mirković et al. (2002)), for example, installs rate-limiting rules
at border routers in source networks; COSSACK (Papadopoulos et al. (2003))
deploys countermeasures at the ASes of attacking sources. Both are early works
that employ the SourceEnd strategy. Later work such as AITF (Argyraki and
Cheriton (2005)) introduced the idea of propagating the defense from the attacking
sources to the victim, thereby providing more flexibility for defense deployment.
Specifically, authors of AITF also observed that the current generation of routers
have sufficient filtering resources to mitigate DDoS attacks as long as the attack
traffic was blocked close to the attacking sources. Furthermore, AITF was also one
of the earliest projects to study hardware rule space during defense. Later work
from Huici et al. (Huici and Handley (2007)) and StopIt (X. Liu et al. (2008))
enhance AITF by introducing security measures against DDoS attacks on the
defensive infrastructure itself. Unlike PushBack solutions, prior to defending
against the attack all SourceEnd solutions need to know the attack topology (i.e.
the attack sources and their AS-level routes toward the victim) for each DDoS
victim. However, obtaining this information is not trivial.
4.3 Modeling DDoS Attacks and Defenses
In order to evaluate the performance of different types of in-network defense
algorithms, we first construct a model to describe DDoS attacks and their defenses.
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In this section, we introduce our general model that describes the Internet, DDoS
attacks, and in-network DDoS defense.
4.3.1 Modeling the Internet. The Internet is a well-interconnected
network consisting of thousands of autonomous systems (ASes). ASes on the
Internet can be represented by the set
N = {n|n is an AS on the Internet}.
The size of N is 63332 at the time of writing (Huston, Smith, and Bates (n.d.)).
The links or edges between ASes can be represented by the set L = {li|i =
1, 2, ..., q}, where q is the total number of links on the Internet. The traffic running
on the Internet can be summarized into flows, where each flow f represent a set
of packets between the source of the flow (denoted as f.src) and the destination
of the flow (denoted as f.dst) for a transaction. In this study, we focus on using IP
addresses to identify an entity involved in a flow. Each flow is also associated with
a volume value, denoted as |f |, which can be represented by the number of packets
or the number of bytes included in the flow.
4.3.2 Modeling DDoS Attacks. The total set of attack sources is
represented by
A = {a|a ∈ N and a is an attack source},
where a represents an attack source in a DDoS attack. Similarly, we define the set
of victim end-hosts as
V = {v|v ∈ N and v is a victim of the DDoS attack}.
Here, one attacking source represents a machine that is controlled by the attacker
and creates unwanted traffic to the victims. Each attacking source can generate
multiple flows with varying volume to a victim at any moment during an attack.
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The set of total attacking flows is represented as
F = {f |f.src ∈ A and f.dst ∈ V},
where f is the attacking flow, generated by an attack source, sent to a victim.
While a DDoS attack can potentially strike multiple targets, for simplicity, the rest
of the paper focuses only on a single victim. Each flow traverses through a set of
ASes on the Internet before reaching the victim. We denote the number of AS links
a flow f must travel through to reach its victim as bf .
4.3.3 Modeling In-Network DDoS Defense. Different from single-
AS edge defense solutions, in-network defenses employ multiple ASes en route of
the DDoS attack traffic to filter unwanted traffic. For each defense solution, we
denote the set of all ASes that are able to participate on defense, or defense pool, as
D and D ⊂ N. However, not all ASes in D will be used by the defense solution. The
set
S = {n|n ∈ D and n is selected for defense}
contains all ASes in the network that are not only able to collaborate on defense,
but also selected to filter traffic during the defense. The defense algorithms decides
which ASes should be utilized for the defense against specific attacks, which takes
the following elements into consideration. Finally, we denote
L = {f |f ∈ F and f is filtered},
for each defense solution.
4.3.3.1 Resource for Defense. Each defending AS has limited
resources in filtering DDoS traffic. Specifically, the main resource limitation is on
the number of filtering rules an AS can employ for DDoS defense purposes. We
define Rmax as the maximum number of filtering rules that can be installed at
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an AS. The defense may also face a limitation on the number of total ASes it can
use, which we denote as Dmax. Rmax reflects the resource limitation at the intra-
AS level, while Dmax reflects the limitation at the inter-AS level. In practice,
the defense algorithms should take both the resource limitation Rmax and scale
limitation Dmax into consideration when initiating defenses.
4.3.3.2 Leakage and Pollution. To quantify the effectiveness of a
solution, we look at two main metrics: leakage and pollution; leakage represents
the total amount of attack traffic that reaches the victim after the defense is
in place, and pollution represents the total amount of attack traffic that flows
through the Internet before it is filtered. The leakage metric shows the defense’s
effectiveness from the victim’s perspective, while pollution reveals the defense’s
impact on reducing the overall DDoS traffic on the Internet. DDoS attacks can
cause link congestion, therefore a DDoS defense algorithm should not only achieve
very low leakage to reduce the attack traffic the victim receives, it also needs
to further reduce the traffic on the paths toward the victim (pollution) to avoid
chance of link congestion.
We define leakage as




where mk is the total number of attack flows mitigated by AS k in the defending
set S. Note that at which AS the filtering happens does not affect the leakage
metric.
We define pollution as
pollution = |F| − |L|.
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Figure 16. Example of calculating the pollution for one attack flow f and an
defense measures. The pollution flow f remains to have after defense is 2, between
AS1 and AS3.
The value of pollution for a defense measures how well a defense strategy does on
limiting the amount of traffic running on the Internet. Clearly, cf = 0 when only
the victim’s AS stops an attack flow f . If an attack flow f is stopped at the source
AS, the value cf becomes cf = bf . Figure 16 shows an example of counting the
pollution for one flow. The attack flow f , of magnitude |f | = 1, travels through the
AS path 1-2-3-4-5, and AS3 deploys DDoS defense and filters f . In this example,
suppose that AS 3 effectively filters the attack flow, the total length of f is bf = 4,
and there are two links after AS3 that will not see f , which means cf = 2. Filtered
at AS3, f contributes bf − cf = 4− 2 = 2 to the overall pollution metric. From this
example, we can see that the closer a flow is filtered to the attack source, the less it
contributes to the overall pollution.
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Table 3. Notations used to describe the general models in this section.
Symbol Definition
N Set of all ASes on the Internet
A Set of all DDoS attack sources
F Set of all attacking traffic flows
V Set of victim end-hosts
D Set of ASes able to participate in defense
S Set of ASes utilized in defense
L Set of filtered DDoS attacking traffic flows
Rmax Maximum number of attack flows an AS can handle
Dmax Maximum number of ASes available for defense
|f | Volume of traffic carried by flow f
bf Number of AS links between a flow f and its victim
mk Number of attack flows mitigated by an AS k
cf Number of ASes on the path of flow f after it is filtered
leakage Total amount of attack traffic reach the victim
pollution Total amount of attack traffic on the Internet
4.4 In-network DDoS Traffic Filtering Strategies
In general, the in-network DDoS traffic filtering strategies can be
summarized into two major types: PushBack strategy that focuses on placing
the defense close to the victim network; and SourceEnd strategy that distribute
defense load among networks close to the attack sources. These types of strategies
have been used in various DDoS defense projects (see Chapter II for more).
However, there is no quantitative study on how the solutions compare to each
other, nor a general model that describes these solutions in a common language.
Therefore, we compare these strategies and study their strengths and weaknesses.
Furthermore, we propose a new strategy called StrategicPoints strategy which
employs ASes at critical locations of the attacks to achieve the high effectiveness
with low cost. In order to compare these strategies, we generalize each strategy and
study each one individually. In the rest of this section, we will describe the three
strategies using the model introduced in Section refsec:modeling.modeling.
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Algorithm 3 PushBack Strategy
Require: P . Pool of participating ASes
Require: v . Victim AS
Require: F . Attack flows
1: procedure PushBack Strategy(v, P,F)
2: P = {v};B = φ
3: for vi ∈ P do
4: add vi to B
5: remove flows vi.filtered_flows() from F
6: add all upstream ASes of vi to P
7: remove vi from P
8: if |F| == 0 or |P | == 0 then
9: break
10: end if




4.4.1 PushBack Strategy. The PushBack strategy propagates the
defense workload from the victim AS to upstream ASes. The PushBack strategy
expands the defensive area from the victim AS to its upstream neighbors one AS
at a time, and further upstream if necessary. PushBack essentially distributes the
DDoS defense load (i.e. the deployment of traffic filtering rules) among the set of
collaborating upstream ASes. PushBack can be applied recursively, allowing it to
cover a larger set of ASes if necessary.
The PushBack strategy runs recursively among the collaborating ASes
starting from the victim AS. We assume that all collaborating ASes exchange
information about any ongoing defense efforts, and the PushBack strategy knows
the filtering status of the attack traffic. The strategy begins by selecting the ASes
that are nearest to the victim as defending ASes. In each round, each defending AS
installs a number of rules to filter a portion of the attack traffic running through it.
If more traffic needs to be filtered, the PushBack strategy will select the next best
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AS from the defense pool to collaborate on defense, where a defense pool consists of
the next available upstream ASes of all current defending ASes, sorted by number
of flows they can filter. PushBack selects the AS that can filter the most DDoS
traffic at each round of defense propagation. The defense propagation ends when
there are no available ASes in the defense pool, the number of defending ASes
exceed the victim’s specified parameter Dmax, or all traffic has been successfully
handled.
Algorithm 4 SourceEnd Strategy
Require: P . Pool of participating ASes
Require: v . Victim AS
Require: F . Attack flows
1: procedure SourceEnd Strategy(v, P,F)
2: P = {v};B = φ
3: for f ∈ F do
4: n = the first collaborating AS on the path of f
5: P = P ∪ {n}
6: end for
7: while |S| > Dmax and P 6= φ do
8: sout P based on amount of traffic it can filter
9: simulate_filter(P [0])
10: B = B ∪ {P [0]}




4.4.2 SourceEnd Strategy. In contrast to the PushBack strategy,
the SourceEnd strategy attempts to select ASes that originate the attack traffic
for defense, thereby stopping the attack directly at the sources. The SourceEnd
strategy intuitively performs better in terms of reducing the overall attack traffic on
the Internet (pollution). However, it requires more participating ASes and traffic
filters to be effective at mitigating the attacks.
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Ideally, the SourceEnd strategy should utilize all collaborating ASes that are
the closest to the attacking sources. However, facing the maximum available ASes
constraint Dmax, the SourceEnd strategy will prioritize collaborating ASes and
only select the ASes that can filter the most DDoS traffic. We describe the strategy
from high level as follows. First, SourceEnd locates the initial defense locations as
potential defending ASes, i.e. the ASes that are closest to the attackers. Then it
sorts all potential ASes by the amount of traffic each AS can filter. It then adds the
top AS to the selected ASes list (S), and removes it from the potential ASes list.
The strategy will repeat the previous two steps until |S| ≥ Dmax, or all flows can
be filtered, or there are no ASes available.
Algorithm 5 StrategicPoints Strategy
Require: Dmax . Maximum allowed ASes to use
Require: v . Victim AS
1: procedure StrategicPoints Strategy(v,Dmax)
2: B = {v}
3: while B 6= D and |B| <= Dmax do
4: sort B based on the traffic each AS carries
5: for x ∈ B do
6: for y ∈ D that is an upstream of x do
7: B = B ∪ {y}
8: end for
9: if x contains no attack sources then
10: B = B − {x}
11: end if







4.4.3 StrategicPoints Strategy. The StrategicPoints strategy,
different from PushBack and SourceEnd strategies, employs ASes based on both
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traffic and topological information, and tries to deploy defenses at strategic
locations inside the network instead of at edges. Although PushBack strategies
can utilize a small number of ASes close to the victim to cover most of the DDoS
traffic, it suffers from potential heavy pollution. Similarly, while SourceEnd
strategy can have minimal pollution on the Internet, it requires a large number
of participating ASes to cover the source ASes. The StrategicPoints strategy, selects
set of ASes that sits on all attack AS paths, as far into the Internet as possible,
to achieve a balance between PushBack and SourceEnd, and target high effective
defense with low pollution and low leakage.
The basic idea of StrategicPoints is to find the ASes that are in strategically
important locations in terms of forwarding attack traffic to the victim. Here, we
believe the most critical ASes are the participating ASes that 1) observe the most
traffic; 2) together consist of a topological cut for all the attack traffic toward the
victim; and 3) are closer to the sources if possible. The strategy first collects the
statistics of the attack traffic distribution among the ASes. It begins by adding
the victim AS to the set of selected defending ASes, B. Then, it builds up B by
continuously replacing ASes in this set with their direct upstream ASes until there
are no more available ASes in the defense pool or Dmax is surpassed. At each step,
we prioritize the ASes by the amount of attack traffic they received, thus pushing
the line of defense from the heavily impacted ASes first until all attack traffic is
filtered. By doing so, the strategy maintains a set of selected ASes that together
consist of a cut of all attack traffic paths toward the victim, and in the meantime,
also moves the defense further toward the attack sources. With sorted selection at
each step, the strategy also balances the defense workload (the amount of traffic an





Figure 17. Examples of three in-network DDoS defense strategies.
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4.4.4 Summary. To summarize, traditional PushBack and SourceEnd
strategies work by deploying traffic filtering rules directly at or close to the victim
or the attack sources correspondingly. StrategicPoints strategy, on the other hand,
selects critical ASes hops away from the victim that carry the most of the attack
traffic and cover all critical paths. It is able to push the defense far to sources
for the heavily congested links, and maintaining close-to-victim defending ASes
for links that are not congested at the moment. This feature further allows the
StrategicPoints strategy to better handle dynamic attacks with shifting attack
sources without over-fitting towards one attack pattern at any given moment.
Figure 17 shows an high-level example of how each strategy works.
4.5 Evaluation Setup
To quantitatively investigate different DDoS defense strategies, we built
a simulation framework that simulates the Internet, DDoS attacks, and in-
network DDoS defense. The simulation follows the model described in Section 4.3
and implements the DDoS filtering strategies described in Section 4.4, with the
following details.
4.5.1 Internet Topology. In this study, we aim to explore the
performance and cost of the in-network filtering strategies under extreme stress, i.e.
very large-scale DDoS attacks. To simulate large-scale DDoS attacks and defenses,
the first step is to construct the Internet topology. We use the full routing table
dump data obtained from RouteViews (University of Oregon (2019)) in August 1st
2018 to build the Internet topology. A full routing table contains the AS-level paths
toward all the reachable IP prefixes, which reflects the full Internet topology from
the perspective of a route collector. By combining the topologies obtained from all
22 RouteViews collectors, we aim to cover as many AS-level links as possible.
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Table 4. DDoS attack traces used in simulation.
Trace name # of sources # of source ASes
CAIDA-2007 (Hick et al. (2007)) ∼4,700 ∼1,400
Merit-2016 (Merit Network (2016)) ∼2,300 ∼1,300
4.5.2 Large-Scale DDoS Attacks. We use two real-world large-scale
DDoS attack traces for this study (Table 6). One real-world attack trace is a DDoS
attack collected by CAIDA in 2007 (Hick, Aben, Claffy, and Polterock (2007)), and
the other is a DDoS attack toward an RADB service collected by Merit in 2016
(Merit Network (2016)). Both traces involve thousands of attack sources originated
from thousands of ASes and can be used to evaluate DDoS defense under real
conditions.
We use the route collectors in RouteViews (University of Oregon (2019))
as the victims of DDoS attacks. We also assume that the AS-level paths are
symmetric, i.e. the AS path from a victim to an attack source is the same as the
AS path from the attack source to the victim, allowing us to build attack flows
using the AS paths in the routing tables. Note as this assumption is not always
true on the Internet, our simulation thus derive results from a constructed topology
that is similar to but not exactly the same as a real Internet topology.
4.5.3 In-network DDoS Defenses. In this simulation we assume all
ASes are able to participate in the defense and a DDoS filtering strategies chooses
the actual defense ASes. The simulation begins with the scenario of no defense.
Then we apply the strategies introduced in Section 4.4 to decide ASes to be used
for defending against the attack. For each simulation run, we vary the Dmax and
Rmax restriction, i.e. the maximum number of ASes available for defense, and the
maximum number of defense rules available at each AS (for simplicity this is the
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same across all ASes). At the end of each run, the simulation framework collects
the simulation results, including values of the metrics introduced in Sec. 4.3):
leakage and pollution.
4.6 Evaluation
We compared different DDoS defense algorithms in terms of their resource
requirements, time to respond to attacks, and resiliency against the intelligent
DDoS attackers. Below we report and analyze the results. Refer to Section 4.5.2
for the datasets we use in the evaluation.
4.6.1 Leakage. First and foremost, DDoS victims care most about the
amount of DDoS traffic still leaking towards them after defense is deployed on the
Internet. As we previously defined, we measure leakage under different resource
constraints to evaluate each algorithm’s effectiveness in filtering out the attack
flows toward the victim. Specifically, for each algorithm, we run simulations for
various combinations of Rmax (i.e. the maximum number of filtering rules each
AS has) and Dmax (i.e. the maximum number of defending ASes the defense can
utilize).
Figure 18 shows the leakage simulation results for three algorithms using
the CAIDA-2007 dataset, with Rmax ranging from 10 to 5000 (about maximum
number of sources of the whole attack) and Dmax ranging from 10 to 1000. It
is clear at within the range of the resource limitations in the simulation, both
PushBack and StrategicPoints outperform SourceEnd on reducing leakage.
StrategicPoints performs slightly worse than PushBack when resource limitations
































































Figure 18. Resource requirement for reducing leakage.
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4.6.2 Pollution. Since both PushBack and StrategicPoints perform
similarly in reducing leakage, we further examine their performance in reducing the
overall pollution on the Internet.
Figure 19 shows simulation results for measuring the pollution for the
three algorithms. It is clear that as Rmax increases, the pollution reductions by
PushBack become less effective. In fact, given a high enough Rmax PushBack
utilizes only the victim AS to defend against the attack, leaving a large portion of
pollution unhandled. This is undesirable when the attack pollution is so high that
it could not only cause extra burden on the ISPs to forward traffic, but also trigger
traffic congestion on the links close to the victim. On the contrary, StrategicPoints
although has similar effectiveness in reducing leakage, it also greatly reduces the
pollution caused by the attack on the Internet, thus further reducing the chances of
link congestion.
To show the comparison more clearly, we also fix Rmax while increasing
Dmax. As shown in Figure 20, both PushBack and StrategicPoints perform well
in reducing leakage, while StrategicPoints outperforms PushBack and reduces
pollution significantly.
4.6.3 Effectiveness against dynamic DDoS attack. One other
important metric for an effective DDoS defense algorithm is how effective it is at
handling DDoS attacks with dynamic attack sources. Specifically, we want to study
how the algorithms perform on a real-world attack trace where there is consistently
more attack sources joining and leaving the attack.
We run three algorithms against the Merit-2016 dataset, using the first
2000 flows (about 15% of the total unique sources) as the training set for locating








































































Figure 19. Resource requirement for reducing pollution.
As the new unique attack sources join the attack, the defending ASes’ rules space
will be gradually filled, and eventually will not be able to handle any more new
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Figure 20. Resource consumption with Rmax = 3000
attack flows. Results with larger number of flows shows similar results, and thus are
omitted.
Figure 21 shows that PushBack is very ineffective in dealing with dynamic
attack scenarios because it selects ASes that are just able to handle the training
flows, allocating no space for new flows and changes of the attacks. StrategicPoints
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Figure 21. Leakage plot for Merit-2016 trace with strategies using 2000 sources in
the first second to locate defending ASes, with both Dmax = 500 and Rmax = 500.
and SourceEnd both perform much better in handling new flows due to the fact
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that they both allocate more overall rule space for defense, allowing defenders to
have more flexibility in handling dynamic attacks.
metrics PushBack SourceEnd StrategicPoints
leakage low high low
pollution high medium low
attack resiliency medium low high
key resource Rmax Dmax Dmax
when to use low Dmax or Rmax Dmax ≈ total sources all other cases
Table 5. Algorithms performance summary and usage suggestion.
4.6.4 Summary. In this section, we evaluated the performance of the
three algorithms using real-world traces, and summarize the key points as follows.
On reducing the leakage of a defense, both StrategicPoints and PushBack
perform similarly well when using a reasonable amount of resources. When Dmax
and Rmax are low, PushBack performs slightly better. SourceEnd, on the other
hand, is only viable when Dmax is very large and close to the total amount of
attack source ASes.
Reducing pollution is also a very important task in that high pollution
could cause link congestion, which would still directly affect the quality of service
for all the traffic toward the victim. On this aspect, StrategicPoints significantly
outperforms PushBack due to the algorithm’s tendency to deploy rules farther into
the Internet thus closer to the sources. When Dmax is very large and close to the
total number of source ASes, SourceEnd could also achieve low pollution.
When facing dynamic attacks where attack sources join and leave during the
attack, it is important that the defense algorithm is flexible and allows deployment
of new filtering rules. Due to its design, PushBack always selects a number of ASes
that are “just enough” for the defense, thus leaving little or no extra rule space for
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new filtering rules to be deployed. On the contrary, StrategicPoints and SourceEnd
select defending ASes in a greedy approach, and always fully utilize the available
Dmax. As a result, ASes selected by either algorithms would have more available
rule space to spare for potential future defense rules.
Table 5 summarizes the key attributes of the three algorithms. Based on
these results, we believe that PushBack is only suitable when Dmax an Rmax are
very low; in all other cases, StrategicPoints can perform best in terms of reducing
leakage and pollution.
4.7 Open Issues
In this section, we discuss our decision to not consider flow volume in our
evaluation, the correlation between the three defense placement strategies and
existing solutions, and the open issue of IP spoofing which will be addressed in
future work. Finally, we derive a conclusion on the necessity of multi-AS over
single-AS DDoS defense solutions.
Flow volume: In evaluating the three algorithms, we currently consider the
flows have the same weight, and volume information is not included. In fact, after
examining the volume information for each sources in the two attack traces, we
observe similar volume for the sources with no significant differences among them.
The reason behind this decision is that the flow volume in both DDoS trace sets
follows a uniform distribution. With that said, our simulation framework in fact
can incorporate traffic volume information when needed. However, our simulation
framework is able to incorporate traffic volume information, and we plan to expand
our evaluation on that direction in the future.
Capturing the essence of existing solutions: We summarize the
PushBack, SourceEnd and StrategicPoints strategies in order to capture the essence
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of the existing multi-AS DDoS defense solutions. The existing solutions may not
follow the exact procedures as we defined. However, we believe our evaluations
provide important insights into the three major defense placement strategies.
IP spoofing: For any well-designed DDoS defense system, it needs to
consider how to protect victims from spoofed traffic. Although we evaluated the
three defense algorithms in non-spoof DDoS attack traces, we plan to evaluate
them in scenarios with IP spoofing as our future work.
In-network over edge defense solutions: Edge DDoS defense solutions
in general are easy to deploy, but costly in operations (i.e., purchasing large
bandwidth links or high performance switches). Edge solutions also cannot prevent
large-scale volumetric attacks that congest the inbound links of defense networks.
For these reasons, we believe in-network DDoS defense solutions are more suitable
for defending against large-scale DDoS attacks of the future.
Deployment for evaluation: This study serves as a pilot study for further
real-world evaluation. Ideally, our next step is to conduct real-world deployment
for evaluation, and collect results from real-world traffic analysis. However, such
evaluation presents the following challenges: 1) it is very difficult (if not impossible)
to deploy a large-scale study platform to achieve the scale simulated in this study;
2) it also requires generating a large amount of traffic from multiple vantage points
and capturing the traffic passing through ASes on each path, which would result in
both high hardware and software requirements at the deployment site; We plan on
extending our evaluation to a smaller-scale real-world deployment as our next step.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we modeled and evaluated different multi-point, in-
networking DDoS traffic filtering algorithms.
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After defining a general model for describing DDoS attacks and defense, we
categorized existing in-network DDoS filtering algorithms into two basic types, i.e.
PushBack and SourceEnd, that cover the majority of the state-of-the-art research
and practice on in-network DDoS filtering. We then introduced StrategicPoints
algorithms that outperform PushBack and SourceEnd algorithms in most cases.
We designed a simulation framework as a common platform to evaluate
major large-scale DDoS attack scenarios and defenses, and evaluated and compared
the three types of multi-point, in-network DDoS filtering algorithms in terms of
their capability in reducing the DDoS traffic leakage to the victim and the pollution
to the whole Internet, as well as their resiliency against dynamic DDoS attacks.
With real-world, Internet-scale DDoS attack traces, our evaluation results
show that when having a low number of ASes for defense, PushBack performs
slightly better than StrategicPoints and significantly better than SourceEnd
in terms of reducing DDoS traffic leakage. As the number of available filtering
ASes increases, or the number of available rules space increases, StrategicPoints
becomes as effective as PushBack on reducing leakage and significantly outperforms
PushBack on reducing pollution caused by DDoS attacks. Finally, we summarized
the algorithms and suggested what algorithms to adopt for DDoS defense based on
the resource availability of the victim.
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CHAPTER V
DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF A DDOS-FILTERING RULE PLACEMENT
ALGORITHM
From Chapter III, we have learned that the majority of the networks on
the Internet can be incentivized to participate in in-network DDoS traffic filtering.
With confidence of the deployment incentives, we can assume a large number of
networks on the Internet can be utilized for in-network filtering purpose. Further
in Chapter IV, we survey, propose, and evaluate different filter placement strategies
for in-network traffic filtering. The StrategicPoints strategy we propose has the best
performance in reducing both leakage and pollution. In this chapter, we design a
concrete StrategicPoints-style DDoS-filtering rule placement algorithm, describe
how it works, and finally evaluate its performance under an in-network traffic
filtering system.
This chapter is derived from part of (Li et al. (2019)) that describes a
DDoS-filtering system called DrawBridge that I participated, especially the latter’s
text related to DrawBridge rule placement design and evaluation for which I am a
primary contributor.
5.1 Overview
As distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks continue to pose a severe
threat to network services and users, in-network traffic filtering becomes more
preferable due the fact that it filters traffic early upstream, and it utilizes collective
filtering capacity from multiple networks. However, as discussed in related work
chapter (Chapter II Section 2.4), there is still a lack of a concrete study on the
design and evaluation of an effective rule placement algorithm that can achieve in-
network filtering on the current Internet.
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In this chapter, we present our design and evaluation of an efficient rule
placement algorithm that can find satisfactory placements for a give set of rules.
Specifically, we design a tree-like data structure called H-tree to model the
placements of the rules on the DDoS traffic topology toward the victim. Our
algorithm aims to maximize the coverage of the DDoS traffic, minimize the rule
space needed for deployment, as well as maximize the distance away from the
victim’s network.
As part of our efforts to design and evaluate an effective in-network rule
placement algorithm, we also briefly introduce a DDoS-filtering system called
DrawBridge in which our algorithm runs. Using DrawBridge, we can evaluate
the efficacy of the rule placement algorithm in a more realistic environment.
Specifically, we evaluate the efficacy of our placement algorithm using both
simulation and distributed emulation via DrawBridge. We show that our placement
algorithm can find effective locations to place filtering rules, and effectively filter
DDoS traffic.
5.2 Design of Rule Placement Mechanism
5.2.1 In-network Filtering System Architecture. The rule
placement algorithm is run when an in-network traffic filtering system has obtained
a set of filtering rules and need to decide where to place the rules for deployment.
We will first introduce system architecture of our in-network filtering system, and
describe the functionalities of each component in the picture.
Our designed system, called DrawBridge, operates as a subscription
service and comprises two main types of players: DrawBridge subscribers who
subscribe to the DrawBridge service and DrawBridge providers who are Internet
service providers (ISPs) that support the deployment of traffic filtering rules and
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other necessary DrawBridge functionalities. We designed DrawBridge to empower
DDoS victims to express their traffic filtering needs in the form of DrawBridge rules
(i.e. traffic filtering rules), and to enable ASes on the Internet (i.e. DrawBridge
providers) to execute these needs and filter DDoS traffic. This filtering process
begins with a DrawBridge subscriber generating traffic filtering rules in response to
any DDoS traffic it receives. Every rule will not only indicate how to filter DDoS
traffic, but may also include associated meta-data about the rule, including the
rule’s priority, timestamp, and a timeout value to indicate when the rule should
expire. The subscriber then sends the rules to its provider, who decides where the
rules should be deployed. The provider who receives the filtering rules from its
subscriber runs the rule placement algorithm, through which it decides the optimal
locations for the deployment of these rules to maximize its efficiency. Figure 22
shows an example of the basic operation of DrawBridge, where the victim is a
subscriber of DrawBridge provider AS 1, and AS 1 is a subscriber of AS 2 and
AS 3. The victim informs the controller in AS 1 what traffic to filter, which in
turn instructs controllers in AS 2 and AS 3, with the rules eventually placed in
two routers in AS 2 and AS 3 to filter DDoS traffic.
A DrawBridge provider can also act as a subscriber to other DrawBridge
providers. A DrawBridge subscriber can thus be an end-host, a sub-network,
an autonomous system (AS), or an ISP. (An ISP can be composed of one or
multiple ASes; below we use AS and ISP interchangeably.) Consequently, all
the subscriber-provider pairs form the DrawBridge network to serve as the
messaging mechanism of DrawBridge. A DrawBridge network is essentially an


















Figure 22. An example of DrawBridge filtering DDoS traffic.
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5.2.2 Processing and Placing Filtering Rules. Once a provider
receives a set of rules from a subscriber, it will verify the authenticity of the rules,
determine whether and where the rules should be deployed, forward rules to their
selected placement locations, and send acknowledgments to the subscriber. The key
task here is rule placement, which is to select the appropriate locations to place
the rules while considering the limited rule space at every AS or switch. We call the
AS or the switch that deploys a rule a host of the rule. When selecting the host for
a rule, a provider can consider not only itself, but also any DrawBridge provider
that may see the DDoS traffic matching the rule. If the provider subscribes to other
DrawBridge providers, it can deploy rules remotely (i.e. inter-AS rule placement).
After discovering which other DrawBridge-capable ASes can and should deploy the
rule in question, the provider then selects an AS and sends the rule to the selected
AS, who may either deploy the rule at one or more local switches, or decline to
deploy the rule at all. If a suitable inter-AS deployment location is unavailable, and
assuming the provider is capable of effectively deploying the rule at one of its own
switches (i.e. intra-AS deployment), it merely finds the switch(es) on the path from
the attackers to the victim, selects switch(es) closest to the attacking source, and
finally deploys the rule at the selected switches.
DrawBridge selects the hosts for a rule as follows. First of all, each filtering
rule should be placed at hosts that are on the paths taken by the DDoS traffic
matching the rule in question, with as many paths covered as possible (e.g. in
Figures 23(b) and 23(c) both paths of DDoS traffic are covered). In the case where
no collaborating ASes see traffic matching the filtering rule, the system must place
the rule at the victim’s AS. On the other hand, if multiple collaborating ASes can
capture the corresponding traffic, i.e. there exist multiple DrawBridge-enabled
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ASes along the AS path from the source to the victim, filtering rules should be
deployed as close to the traffic source (or as far from the victim AS) as possible,
thereby limiting the aggregation of the attack traffic before it reaches downstream
ASes. Moreover, for each of these paths, there may exist multiple host candidates;
if so, the rule should be deployed as close to the traffic source—or as far from the
subscriber—as possible, since the volume of DDoS traffic may become too large to
handle at a host closer to the subscriber (Figure 23(b)). On the other hand, if two
paths converge at an intersection point, it may be better to deploy the rule at a
host that is located at or downstream from the intersection, thus only deploying
the rule at one host rather than two in order to conserve rule space (Figure 23(c)).
Finally, it is possible that a suitable host may not even exist for a given rule, for
example, when there are no host candidates on a path of the DDoS traffic, or when
the selected host on the path is unavailable due to the lack of space for new rules,
further limiting the choices for rule placement (Figure 23(d)). We describe the
algorithm for rule placement in Section 5.3.
In order to increase the efficacy of the in-network traffic filtering, as
part of the rule placement procedure, the provider will adjust the subscriber’s
rules to better match the available deployment locations, thus taking advantage
of information unavailable to the subscriber— specifically the locations and
availability of other providers in the DrawBridge network. For example, the
provider can choose to aggregate two rules into one if this aggregation will result
in better use of available deployment locations. This type of rule aggregation takes
advantage of the intersection between two given AS-level paths by taking two
rules with different corresponding source ASes (and thus different AS-level paths),
discovering the paths’ intersection, and aggregating to a single rule that must now
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
unfiltered traffic
candidate unavailable candidate host
victim attacker filtered traffic
Figure 23. Example scenarios for rule placement.
be deployed at an AS in the intersecting set. This aggregation will never introduce
collateral damage, nor will it cause decreased coverage from the subscriber’s
original ruleset. Rather, the cost of this second-phase aggregation is merely an
increase in potential collateral damage as smaller-prefix rules are aggregated into
larger prefixes that cover more unknown or unseen sources.
Since the host(s) for a rule must be on the path(s) of the DDoS traffic
matching the rule, DrawBridge needs to discover such path(s) in order to discover
the host(s). Specifically, a provider must be able to discover the AS-level path(s)
of the traffic, and a provider’s DrawBridge controller needs to know the switch-
level path(s) inside the provider. This task is difficult since the routes between any
two given nodes on the Internet are often asymmetric, meaning that between two
nodes, the path taken by traffic traveling in one direction is not the same as that
taken by traffic flowing in the opposite direction (He, Faloutsos, Krishnamurthy,
and Huffaker (2005)). The subscriber, for example, cannot base on the sources of
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its DDoS traffic to determine the paths taken by the DDoS traffic. For the former,
DrawBridge utilizes existing path inference solutions (such as described in (Burch
and Cheswick (2000); Gong and Sarac (2008); Katz-Bassett et al. (2010); Mao, Qiu,
Wang, and Zhang (2005); Savage, Wetherall, Karlin, and Anderson (2000); Shi,
Zhang, Li, and Reiher (2018); Snoeren et al. (2001))). Certainly no path inference
system is perfect, but even semi-accurate path inference will serve the purposes of
DrawBridge. For the latter, the DrawBridge controller (which is an SDN controller
of the provider) can directly extract the path information using the provider’s
internal topology and routing information.
A provider then conducts the rule placement procedure as follows. It will
iterate through the set of rules in increasing order of their priority. For each rule,
it will discover the paths of the DDoS traffic matching the rule, identify host
candidates on these paths, and choose which host candidates, if selected as the
set of hosts of the rule, would cover as many paths as possible (thus the best
efficacy possible), have the furthest possible distance from the subscriber (thus least
possible to handle an overwhelming amount of DDoS traffic), and also have space
for the rule at each of them. Once the provider chooses the hosts for the rules, it
then can try to deploy the rules at them. If hosts are switches inside the provider,
the DrawBridge controller of the provider then can use SDN to place rules at those
switches. If hosts are other DrawBridge providers, the provider in question then
uses the DrawBridge network to send a rule installation message to every host to
install the rules for that host.
Upon receiving a rule request from one of its subscribers, a DrawBridge
provider further distributes the rule request to its provider(s), and so on. Each
provider who receives a rule request must determine whether it sees any traffic
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that matches the rules so it can send a confirmation to the subscriber who sent the
rule request. Each provider also waits to receive confirmations from its immediate
upstream providers before sending a confirmation to the requesting subscriber.
After receiving confirmations from upstream providers, the original DrawBridge
provider has enough information to run the rule placement algorithm in Section 5.3
to select the appropriate deployment locations.
5.3 Algorithmic Design for Rule Placement
In Section 5.2, we discussed the systematic design of the components
involved in a in-network filtering systems, and described the rule-placement
procedure in high level. In this section, we dig deeper into the design of the rule
placement algorithm, and try to answer the following question: given a set of
traffic filtering rules, how can we find the best locations to place the rules so that
the DDoS can be most effectively mitigated? Here, we assume that a set of rules
are provided as input, and the rule generation procedure is out of the scope of this
dissertation.
5.3.1 Problem Formulation. We assume a DrawBridge provider
needs to place a set of rules R={ri|i=1, . . . , n}, where ri is a rule with a priority
of yi. Each rule ri∈R has a set of host candidates Ci={cij|j=1, . . . , |Ci|},
where cij is dij hops away from the subscriber and has space to accommodate
sij rules. We represent a placement solution of R as a vector of host sets:
P (R)=<H1, H2, ..., Hn>, where Hi={hik|k=1, . . . , |Hi|} (i=1, . . . , n) is the set
of hosts for ri and hik is dik hops away from the subscriber. We define the following
for P (R):
efficacy of P (R): For rule ri∈R, its host set Hi may not cover all the paths
that need rule ri to filter the DDoS traffic. Assuming ei is the fraction of paths that
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d(P (R)): average deployment distance of P (R): As discussed in
Section 5.2.2, the further away a host is from the subscriber, the less likely it
will have to handle a large amount of DDoS traffic. We can define the average













s(P (R)): rule space overhead of P (R): As every host of a rule needs a copy






as ri is deployed at |Hi| hosts.
We therefore define the rule placement problem as a following multi-
objective optimization problem:
With a set of rules R={ri|i = 1, ..., n} and a given topology of host
candidates, how may a DrawBridge provider find a placement solution
P (R) such that among all possible placement solutions over the topology,
P (R) has the maximal e(P (R)), minimal s(P (R)), and maximal d(P (R))?
As with the multi-objective optimization problem for rule generation, we
solve the rule placement problem defined above by formulating multiple single-
objective optimization problems and seeking the solution to each of them as a
Pareto optimal solution to the multi-objective rule placement optimization problem.
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Like the solution to rule generation, this solution is again Pareto optimal since
an objective cannot be improved upon without degrading other objectives. In a
similar way that rule generation allows the subscriber more freedom to choose
what objectives to optimize for when generating rules, rule placement allows the
provider more freedom to choose what objectives to optimize for when placing rules
in the Internet (e.g., maximize e(P (R)), minimize s(P (R)), or maximize d(P (R))),
depending on the circumstances.
Assuming a rule placement solution cannot exceed storage overhead S and
the selected hosts must be at least D hops away from the subscriber on average (we
leave the choice of S and D to be out of the scope of this study), we focus on the
following single-objective problem:
With a set of rules R={ri|i = 1, ..., n} and a given topology of
host candidates, find a placement solution P (R) that maximizes e(P (R))
whereas s(P (R))≤S and d(P (R))≥D.
5.3.2 H-tree Data Structure. For every rule to place we introduce
a tree data structure called H-tree. It is rooted at the subscriber, where every other
node represents a host candidate of the rule, with the leaf nodes representing the
candidates furthest from the subscriber. It encompasses all the paths covered by
all the host candidates. Every node on the H-tree is also associated with an s value
that indicates how many rules the node can further accommodate. Every node
on the H-tree also records how many rules the node can further accommodate.
Figure 24 shows two example H-trees for two rules, respectively.
Once a DrawBridge provider discovers the AS-level (if an inter-AS topology)
or switch-level (if an intra-AS topology) paths that the DDoS traffic matching
the rule would use, as discussed in Section 5.2.2, it can check which DrawBridge
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Figure 24. Two example H-trees.
providers or switches are on each path, respectively, and use them to construct the
H-tree of the rule.
The H-tree for a subscriber’s rule has several important properties related to
selecting the hosts of the rule:
• Along every path to the subscriber only one node needs to be selected as a host
to cover the path.
• A cut set of the tree covers all paths to the subscriber.
• The cut set using all the leaf nodes is the cut set furthest from the subscriber.
• H-trees for different rules may have host candidates in common; nodes closer to
the subscriber are more likely to be a common host candidate for multiple rules.
5.3.3 Rule Placement Algorithm. We now describe how a provider
finds the placement solution P (R) for a set of rules R={ri|i = 1, ..., n}. The
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provider will iterate through the rules according to their priority (starting with
the rule with the highest priority), identify the set of hosts to use for the current
rule, and append the set to P (R) (initially empty). The P (R) at the end is then
the solution. The core operation at each iteration is to process the H-tree of the
current rule, say ri, and discover a cut set of the H-tree to be the set of hosts for
rule ri, with the following steps:
(i.) The provider determines the allowed maximum size of the cut set.
Denote R′={rj|j = 1, ..., i − 1} to be set of rules already handled, P (R′) the
placement of R′, and s(P (R′)) the storage overhead of P (R′). Given that the
storage overhead for P (R) cannot be more than S, the cut set then cannot be
larger than L=S-s(P (R′)). (If L is zero, the provider will end the iteration and
return P (R′) as P (R).)
(ii.) The provider discovers the cut set Hi of the H-tree that, among all
the cut sets with no more than L nodes, is the furthest from the subscriber. The
procedure is as follows: if the cut set with all the leaf nodes (which is the furthest
cut set) has no more than L nodes, it then returns this cut set; otherwise, it will
recursively replace sibling nodes with a parent node to construct a new, smaller cut
set, until it obtains a cut set with no more than L nodes.
(iii.) For every host candidate in Hi that has no space for rule ri, say X,
the provider will traverse the path from X toward the subscriber, discover the
first host candidate, say Y , that has space for rule ri, and replace X and all other
Y ’s descendants in Hi with Y . In case no node exists to replace X, the provider
simply removes X from Hi. Note that the algorithm does not require hosts to
reveal information of available rule space in their networks, which can be considered
sensitive information that ASes would not be willing to share. When a host AS is
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asked to deploy a rule ri, it can simply express whether it is willing to deploy ri
without revealing any sensitive information about the inner workings of its network.
(iv.) If Hi may shorten the average deployment distance such that
d(<P (R′), Hi>))<D, the provider will recursively remove the host candidate in
Hi that has the shortest hops from the subscriber, until d(<P (R′), Hi>))≥D.
As a result, for every rule ri, the provider obtains a set of hosts Hi that
covers the maximal number of paths of the DDoS traffic targeted by ri, respects
the space constraints, and has the largest possible distance from the subscriber.
The rule placement algorithm thus finds an optimal solution to the aforementioned
single-objective rule placement problem. As detailed in the next subsection, it is
polynomial-time in the worst case, and therefore is scalable in terms of the number
of rules and host candidates. Furthermore, the algorithm can easily be adapted
to solve the rule placement problem for the other potential objectives (minimize
s(P (R)) or d(P (R))).
Let us use the H-tree in Figure 24(a) as an example. Assuming S is
large enough to allow cut sets of any size, the provider will identify cut set
H={C2, C4, C5} composed of all leaf nodes. If C2, C4 and C5 all have space, the
provider will use all three of them. If, say, C5 has no space but C3 does, C3 will
replace C5 as well as C4, resulting in H={C2, C3}. If neither C3 nor C1 has space,
no replacement of C5 exists, we simply remove C5 and result in H={C2, C4}.
5.3.4 Algorithm Complexity Analysis. The best-case scenario
complexity of the rule placement algorithm is O(n), where n is the number of rules.
In the best case, the number of hosts closest to the sources for all rules will be
within S (storage overhead), so the algorithm takes linear time (O(1)) to traverse
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the H-tree. In other words, for each rule, traversing the H-tree will take O(1) and
thus doing this for n rules will lead to a complexity of O(n).
The worst-case scenario complexity is O(
∑n
i=1 |Ci|). This is because in the
worst case, the algorithm will traverse through each host in the H-tree in order to
meet the four aforementioned criteria. In other words, traversing the tree for each
rule i will take O(|Ci|) and doing this for n rules will lead to O(
∑n
i=1 |Ci|).
5.4 Rule Placement Efficacy Evaluation
In Section 5.2, we discussed the systematic design of the components
involved in a in-network filtering systems, and described the rule-placement
procedure in high level. In Section 5.3, we dig into details of the design and
complexity of our placement algorithm. In this section, we will evaluate the
performance of the placement algorithm.
5.4.1 Evaluation Setup. We built a simulation to measure the
performance of rule-placement algorithm against real-world, large-scale DDoS
attacks, which we replay using three captured real-world DDoS attack traces that
are of different sizes and attack dynamics (Table 6): RADB-2016 (Merit Network
(2016)) with the DNS protocol and ∼16,000 DDoS sources, Booter1-2015
(Santanna et al. (2015)) with the DNS protocol and ∼4,500 DDoS sources, and
CAIDA-2007 (Hick et al. (2007)) with the ICMP protocol and ∼7,000 DDoS
sources. Moreover, we also deployed and evaluated the placement algorithm using
real traffic and physical equipment on GENI testbed (Berman et al. (2014)).
Table 6. DDoS attack traces used for evaluation.





5.4.2 Static Rule Placement. We first study the performance
of rule placement algorithm in a static attack environment where the attack
sources does not change over time, and the placement algorithm only need to be
conducted once. We evaluate rule placement algorithm against a number of distinct
deployment profiles (shown in Table 7), which represent different rates of AS
participation in the in-network filtering. We set deployment rates for ASes in tiers
1, 2, and 3, where the total number of ASes in each tier is 89, 8442, and 47052,
respectively. Full deployment of DrawBridge is clearly unrealistic, but we use these
profiles as a baseline. The “victim only” profile represents a scenario in which the
entire network consists of a single subscriber and its provider, which means that all
rules must be deployed at local switches controlled by the provider.
Table 7. Deployment profiles for rule placement.
Name Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Total #
Full Deployment 100% 100% 100% 55583
Tier 1 only 100% 0% 0% 89
Top-centered 100% 50% 0% 4310
Middle-centered 0% 80% 20% 9410
Bottom-centered 0% 20% 80% 39330
Victim only 0% 0% 0% 1
We first evaluate the rule placement success rate, i.e. the percentage of rules
for which suitable locations are found. Figure 25 depicts the success rate under
each profile. The first and most obvious trend displayed is that the success rate
for all profiles either remains stable or generally increases as we increase the per-
AS rule limit from 1 to 1000. Clearly, more available rule space at deploying ASes
results in fewer rule deployment failures due to exhausted space. Another trend
is the impact of a higher overall deployment rate for DrawBridge. Overall, the












































Figure 25. Rule placement success rates.
system itself, though increasing the deployment rate for some AS tiers has different
effects than for others. As expected, the lowest success rate belongs to the victim-
only profile, while the highest rate is achieved by the full deployment profile. The
four profiles in between generally perform much better than the victim-only profile,
and slightly or moderately worse than the full-deployment profile, where the top-
centered profile is the only profile of these four to reach nearly 100% success rate,
and generally performs better than the others. The middle-centered profile is
not far behind, however, and actually reaches higher success rates than the top-
centered profile when the number of rules per AS is low. The tier-1-only profile is
the most sensitive to the per-AS rule limit, as with only 89 tier-1 ASes each AS
faces pressure to deploy more rules than other profiles; it thus has a lower success
rate than other profiles (except for victim-only) when the per-AS rule limit is low,
but gradually improves as the limit gets higher.
Next, we examine how many rules are placed at each participating AS
under five different deployment profiles while each AS can only deploy at most
10, 100, or 1000 rules (Figure 26). Three figures show similar trends, and we take
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Figure 26a as an example. Across all deployment profiles except the tier-1-only
profile, approximately 60% or more of ASes that participate in the defense must
deploy only a single rule, approximately 95% or more of ASes deploy no more than
10 rules, and thus a very small percentage of ASes deploy more than 10 rules.
In these cases, increasing the per-AS rule limit past 100 would have little effect,
since even a per-AS limit of 10 results in very few (10%) ASes with between 10
and 100 rules deployed. For the tier-1-only profile, the rules are more spread out
among all ASes, but note this profile corresponds to the smallest actual number of
ASes. Overall, we can see that rather than employing a defense evenly distributed
among all ASes, DrawBridge takes advantage of the fact that for any given attack,
a small number of ASes are in especially advantageous locations and can contribute
disproportionately to the defense.
5.4.3 Dynamic Rule Placement in Simulation. We also evaluate
the overall efficacy of the rule placement algorithm within the overall DrawBridge
system as we defend in real time against real-world DDoS attack traces with
multiple rounds of rule placement for continuous incoming sets of rules. The total
number of deployed rules never exceeds the budget set by the subscriber while the
coverage needs to be above a threshold. Figure 27 shows two representative time
series for defense against two replayed DDoS attacks with dissimilar dynamics
(CAIDA-2007 and RADB-2015). For each attack, we show the number of DDoS
flows filtered by DrawBridge at each second, as well as the number of flows that
arrive at the victim when no filtering is performed; although not shown, no
legitimate flows are ever filtered. The rule placement algorithm is dynamically and


































































(c) 1000 rules per AS
Figure 26. The distribution of the number of rules deployed at each DrawBridge-
participating AS.
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(a) CAIDA-2007 DDoS attack under rules for maximal coverage with various
rule budgets.


























(b) RADB-2015 DDoS attack under rules for minimal number of rules with
various required DDoS coverage.
Figure 27. Time series of DrawBridge’s filtering of DDoS flows. The “total” curve
shows DDoS flows w/o filtering.
efficacy. The filtering efficacy results reflects the performance of the rule placement
algorithm.
More specifically, Figure 27a applies rules that are generated based on
source addresses of the traffic toward maximal DDoS coverage under zero collateral
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damage requirement and three different rule budgets (100, 200, and 500, which
represent roughly 1.5%, 3%, and 7%, respectively, of the total approximately 7,000
DDoS sources). Here, as expected, the more effective filtering is achieved with a
higher value for the rule budget, and even with a tight budget of 100 source-based
rules that is only 1.5% of DDoS sources, 60-70% of DDoS flows will be filtered.
Figure 27b instead applies rules that are generated toward minimum number of
rules under zero collateral damage requirement and three different requirements on
minimum DDoS coverage (100%, 70%, and 50%). The generation and placement of
rules tracks very closely the spikes in the attack traffic, demonstrating the overall
accuracy of DrawBridge’s rule generation and placement algorithms. In particular,
with rules required to cover 100% DDoS, although initially not all DDoS flows are
filtered, it takes only about 13 seconds for DrawBridge to begin filtering all DDoS
flows at every second afterwards.
5.4.4 Dynamic Rule Placement in Real Network. To further
evaluate the placement algorithm under more realistic environment and using
real network traffic, we deployed the system on the GENI (Global Environment
for Network Innovations) testbed (Berman et al. (2014)), and emulated DDoS
attacks to measure the traffic filtering performance. Based on an Internet topology
that consists of all Internet ASes as of June 2018, we chose a subgraph of 1 tier-
1 AS, 18 tier-2 ASes, and 31-tier3 ASes as a deployment topology of DrawBridge
where each of the total 50 ASes is a DrawBridge-participating AS and they form
a DrawBridge network. We attach a local machine to one of the 50 ASes as a
DrawBridge subscriber.
Each of these 50 ASes is supported with two virtual machines provided
by GENI. The first virtual machine for each AS runs a Ryu controller as an SDN
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(a) Traffic time series under rules for minimal collateral damage with a rule
budget of 150 rules to cover 100% of DDoS traffic.














(b) Traffic time series under rules for maximal DDoS coverage without any
collateral damage and with a rule budget of 200 rules.
Figure 28. Volume of legitimate and DDoS traffic over time before and during
traffic filtering on GENI.
controller, an Open vSwitch (Pfaff et al. (2015)) as an SDN switch that can deploy
OpenFlow rules, and a DrawBridge controller on the Ryu controller, where the
Open vSwitch is populated with a forwarding table by running the OSPF routing
protocol (as in (Moy (2017))) over the deployment topology. The second virtual
machine for each AS acts as an end-host in the AS that can generate benign
traffic toward a destination from different IP addresses of the AS. More, in order
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to emulate large-scale DDoS attacks on the deployment topology, we installed a
DDoS agent on each AS’s second virtual machine. It can receive commands about a
variety of DDoS attacks from a bot master that we deployed on GENI and generate
DDoS traffic toward a victim at a scheduled time from different IP addresses of an
IP prefix from the AS.
Our procedure is as follows: we first bootstrap the DrawBridge network by
providing each AS’s local DrawBridge controller with a routing table that contains
a mapping from each destination to the next-hop controller, thus allowing messages
to flow between DrawBridge controllers.
The system runs smoothly on this platform with good performance and
low network overhead. It also runs fast with rule generation at 105 milliseconds
on average and rule placement mainly subject to network latency. The network
overhead is no more than 10 kilobytes each round for rule deployment.
We launch an emulated 100-Gbps DDoS attack toward the subscriber from
roughly 1000 unique source addresses, together with 40- to 60-Gbps legitimate
traffic to the subscriber from ∼200 sources. In this case, with the subscriber’s
generated rules, we run the placement algorithm as part of the system’s filtering
pipeline, and deploy input rules at desired locations to filter the DDoS traffic in
question.
Figure 28 shows the defense in two different scenarios. In the first scenario
(Figure 28a) where the defense begins at second 48, it takes only approximately
3 seconds for the filtering of DDoS traffic to reach 100%. Since we are using
source-based filtering, and the number of unique attack sources (1000) is relatively
high compared to the rule budget of 150, some collateral damage has to happen,
preventing the volume of legitimate traffic since second 48 from recovering to
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the level seen before the attack; nonetheless, the legitimate traffic does recover
relative to the sharp dip to about 11 Gbps while DDoS is at its peak. In the
second scenario (Figure 28b), we increase the rule budget to 200 and require zero
collateral damage; although we no longer filter as much of the DDoS traffic as the
first scenario, we filter enough to relieve the link congestion, while all the legitimate
traffic can continue to flow at its previous rate.
5.5 Conclusion
In-network DDoS traffic filtering requires not only the participation from
network providers on the Internet, but more importantly the effective decisions
from the defender on how to utilize the participants in order to achieve the
maximum efficacy of defense. There lacks an effective placement algorithm that can
achieve high performance on both reducing the traffic to the victim and on flowing
on the Internet unfiltered.
In this chapter, we present our design of an efficient rule placement
algorithm that can find optimal placements for a give set of rules. To achieve
optimal results, we design a tree-like data structure called H-tree to model the
placements of the rules on the DDoS traffic topology toward the victim. As a
result, our algorithm can find placement locations that maximize the coverage of
the DDoS traffic, minimize the rule space needed for deployment, and maximize the
distance away from the victim’s network.
As part of our efforts to build an effective in-network filtering system,
we also briefly introduce our design of the DrawBridge system in this Chapter.
Through DrawBridge, we can evaluate the efficacy of the placement algorithm in
more realistic environment. We evaluate the efficacy of our placement algorithm
using both simulation and distributed emulation via DrawBridge. We show that
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our placement algorithm can find effective locations to place filtering rules, and
effectively filter high-volume DDoS traffic.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusions
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks continue to threaten the
availability and integrity of critical Internet infrastructure upon which the society
relies more heavily than ever before. As the attack’s frequency and severity
continues to increase, the current defense paradigm and solutions fail to stay
ahead. Traditional “edge-defense” solutions suffer from high-filtering cost and early
congestion problems; and it has become a never-ending arms-race between the ever-
growing strength of botnets and the defender’s invested infrastructure. In the mean
time, “in-network-defense” solutions has promising features to address the problems,
but are less explored and yet put into practice. This dissertation has studied the
in-network defense solutions from both theoretical aspects and systematical aspects,
and come up with the following conclusions:
– ISPs inside the Internet can be incentivized to participate in the filtering
DDoS traffic;
– There are two major types of existing in-network defense strategies
(PushBack and SourceEnd); our proposed StrategicPoints strategy
outperforms the existing ones in most cases;
– We designed an in-network traffic filtering rule placement algorithm that can
locate optimal filtering rule deployment locations and achieve effective traffic
filtering.
Specifically, we have made the following contributions and observations in
each section.
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In Chapter III, we proposed a game-theoretical model that examines the
incentives of ASes to invest in efforts on DDoS defense. Based on the model,
we built a large-scale simulation system that can simulate the path propagation
procedure on the Internet with consideration of DDoS defense efforts of each
provider AS. Through simulation, we observed the following patterns from
the simulation results. The majority of the provider ASes on the Internet can
benefit from providing DDoS defense services to their customers if they can
compensate the defense cost by charging the filtering of DDoS traffic. The severity
of DDoS attacks affects the charge rate that a provider can place on its potential
customers; if a provider sees a higher volume of DDoS traffic going through its
potential customers, it would charge higher to achieve its peak profit. The level
of competition also drives down the charge rate. These observations provide
confidence that provider ASes on the Internet can have incentive to participate
in DDoS defense.
In Chapter IV, we modeled and evaluated different multi-point, in-
networking DDoS traffic filtering algorithms. We categorized existing in-network
DDoS filtering algorithms into two basic types, i.e. PushBack and SourceEnd, then
introduced StrategicPoints algorithms that outperform PushBack and SourceEnd
algorithms in most cases. Through simulation, we evaluated and compared the
three types of multi-point, in-network DDoS filtering algorithms in terms of their
capability in reducing the DDoS traffic leakage to the victim and the pollution to
the whole Internet, as well as their resiliency against dynamic DDoS attacks. With
real-world, Internet-scale DDoS attack traces, our evaluation results show that
StrategicPoints is as effective as PushBack on reducing leakage and significantly
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outperforms PushBack and SourceEnd on reducing the pollution caused by DDoS
attacks.
In Chapter V, we introduced our design and evaluation of an in-network
DDoS traffic filtering rule placement algorithm that is effective against large-
scale DDoS attacks and able to locate satisfactory placement locations for traffic
filtering rules. Specifically, we designed a tree-like data structure called H-tree to
model the placements of the rules on the DDoS traffic topology toward the victim.
Our algorithm aims to maximize the coverage of the DDoS traffic, minimize he
rule space needed for deployment, as well as maximize the distance away from
the victim’s network. As part of our efforts to design and evaluate an effective
in-network rule placement algorithm, we also briefly introduced a DDoS-filtering
system called DrawBridge in which our algorithm runs. Using DrawBridge,
we evaluated the efficacy of the rule placement algorithm in a more realistic
environment. Specifically, we evaluated the efficacy of our placement algorithm
using both simulation and distributed emulation via DrawBridge. We showed that
our placement algorithm can find effective locations to place filtering rules, and
effectively filter DDoS traffic.
6.2 Future Work
There are multiple future directions that the work of dissertation can further
develop into.
We can further expand the incentive study to connect it to real-world
network operations. By incorporating operational information, such as pricing
models, per-network available resources, and real-world inter-network relationships,
we can improve study to more closely model the Internet operations. We can
also study the interactions between customers and providers, as opposed to only
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provider-provider interactions, to expand the scope of this model. The expansion
of the study should allow researchers and operators to better design and deploy
in-network DDoS filtering solutions.
Second direction is to further evaluate our in-network traffic-filtering rule
placement algorithm in real-world production-level network operations. Although
we have evaluated our algorithm under both simulated and testbed environment,
an evaluation from a real setting can be more convincing for its efficacy against
real-world DDoS attacks.
A third direction can be explored to focus on the inter-operatability between
filtering rule placement and other components for DDoS traffic filtering. Such
components can be DDoS detection software, traffic classification software and
algorithms, different traffic forwarding/filtering infrastructure, etc.
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